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TOWARD A JUST MODEL OF PRETRIAL 
RELEASE: 
A HISTORY OF BAIL REFORM AND A 
PRESCRIPTION FOR WHAT’S NEXT 
ALEXA VAN BRUNT 
LOCKE E. BOWMAN 
The criminal justice system is in the midst of the “third wave” of bail 
reform in the United States.  The current movement aims to end the 
ingrained practices of wealth-based discrimination in pretrial 
administration.  The authors—civil rights attorneys who have litigated the 
issue of cash bond in Cook County, Illinois—have been on the front lines of 
this policy shift.  From this vantage, we conduct a historical analysis of 
modern-day bail reform efforts in the “first” and “second” waves of bail 
reform, and examine the impact of these reforms on incarceration rates and 
racial disparities in the justice system.  We explain how these earlier efforts 
both influenced and created the conditions for the third wave reforms that 
are now underway, including a “groundswell” of class action litigation 
that seeks to minimize pretrial detention by breathing new life into 
longstanding principles of equal protection and due process.  We then 
analyze the impact of these third wave reforms nationwide, while using 
Cook County as a case study.  The results suggest reason for both optimism 
and caution, particularly in jurisdictions where advocates have been 
willing to trade a more expansive scheme of preventive detention for the 
elimination of the cash bail system.  We conclude with observations in 
support of a just system of pretrial release—one that relies neither on 
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as plaintiffs’ counsel in the class action lawsuit, Zachary Robinson and Michael Lewis et al. 
v. Leroy Martin Jr. et al., No. 2016 CH 13578 (Cir. Ct. Ck. Cty.) (filed Oct. 14, 2016), 
which challenged the use of monetary conditions in Cook County’s pretrial release 
decisions. They continue to litigate the issue of pretrial detention in Illinois. 
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money bond nor on preventive detention measures.  This system is one in 
which the vast majority of the presumptively innocent people charged with 
offenses are immediately released back into their communities.  It is a 
system in which courts provide services rather than onerous conditions, to 
minimize failures to appear in court, mitigate recidivism, and ensure that 
communities are not decimated by unconstitutional pretrial detention.  
While this model is not without some societal risk, we contend it is the only 
tolerable outcome under our constitutional system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The criminal justice system is in the midst of what has been termed the 
“third wave” of bail reform in the United States.1  The current movement—
similar to reform efforts in the mid-twentieth century—seeks to end a 
system of ingrained, institutionalized wealth-based incarceration.2  As we 
recount, the current bail reform efforts have resulted in a number of 
remarkable early successes.  This Article aims to provide a historical 
context in which to evaluate these recent achievements and, in particular, to 
assess their staying power.  We are not bystanders to the current reform 
efforts.  We write out of a personal commitment to ending unjust pretrial 
incarceration of those too poor to purchase freedom.3  Section I provides a 
historical overview of the institution of money bond and efforts to reform 
 
 1 See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L. 
REV. 837, 839 (2016) (describing the “tipping point” in the reform movement, away from 
monetary bail and an overreliance on pretrial detention) (citing Lisa Foster, Dir. Office for 
Access to Justice, Remarks at ABA’s 11th Annual Summit on Public Defense (Feb. 6, 
2016)); see also Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L. J. 490, 492–93 
(2018) (describing the movement to replace the system of monetary bail with one based on 
the defendant’s risk of recidivism). 
 2 Mayson, supra note 1, at 508. Caleb Foote, a criminal justice advocate and reformer in 
mid-twentieth century America and an observer of the so-called second wave of bail reform, 
described in 1965 a crisis in the pretrial system, particularly as applied to the poor and 
indigent. In one famous work, he stated that it “has been established that pretrial 
imprisonment of the poor solely as a result of their poverty, under harsher conditions than 
those applied to convicted prisoners, so pervades our system that for a majority of 
defendants accused of anything more serious than petty crimes, the bail system operates 
effectively to deny rather than to facilitate liberty pending trial.” Caleb Foote, The Coming 
Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I (Bail I), 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 960 (1956). Foote posited 
presciently that the “next major clash between our norms of actual administration and the 
constitutional theories expounded in recent years by the Supreme Court” would concern the 
systemic wealth-based discrimination in the bail system. Id. at 962. Unfortunately, the 
reforms advanced in Foote’s lifetime, and particularly those implemented during the “tough 
on crime” era of the 1970s and 1980s, led to the expansion of the pretrial detention system 
rather than its constriction. See infra Section I(B)(4). 
 3 The authors, with co-counsel, brought class action litigation against Cook County, 
Illinois judges who impose monetary bonds on arrestees without making findings as to their 
ability to pay or who willfully ignore their inability to pay. This dereliction has left 
thousands confined in the Cook County Jail because they lack the funds to purchase their 
freedom. See generally Class Action Complaint, Robinson et al. v. Martin et. al., No. 2016 
CH 13587 (filed Oct. 14, 2016). The Robinson suit was brought in collaboration with Matt 
Piers, Chirag Badlani and Kate Schwartz, from the law firm of Hughes Socol Piers Resnick 
& Dym, Ltd., and Alec Karakatsanis of Civil Rights Corps. Civil Rights Corps has helped 
lead the charge in bringing the spate of new litigation described in infra Section II(A). 
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that system.  Section II describes the legal arguments that present-day 
reformers are deploying to push for an end to wealth discrimination in pre-
trial incarceration.  Section III outlines the results of litigation attacking the 
bond system.  And Section IV offers some concluding, cautionary remarks 
about how to cement and institutionalize meaningful change. 
Section I begins with a brief history of the antecedents of the United 
States’ pretrial release system.  We then turn to an overview of bail reform 
efforts4 in the decades since Robert F. Kennedy, in 1964, decried a system 
that enabled those with means to gain their freedom but consigned the poor 
to jail for inability to post bond.5  The mid-twentieth century movement—
retrospectively termed the “first wave” of bail reform—coincided with the 
civil rights movement and the War on Poverty.  High-minded reformers, 
from the federal halls of power to the non-profit sector to the academy, 
imagined a system in which the presumption of innocence would be 
honored; the overwhelming majority of criminally accused persons would 
be entitled to freedom prior to trial; and, certainly, a person’s wealth would 
not be the arbiter of whether he remained in custody following arrest.6 
But pretrial administration in this country has proceeded along two 
divergent tracks.  The ideals of liberty and presumptive innocence part 
company with the reality of judicial decision-making in local criminal 
courts.  Judicial officers overseeing bail hearings—driven by concern for 
community safety and, even in some cases, by a desire to preemptively 
punish—have consistently paid less heed to state and constitutional law 
 
 4 The terms “bail” and “bond” are often used interchangeably in American discourse. 
However, a historical understanding of pretrial detention posits bail as a “system of release,” 
while bond is the shorthand used to describe the conditions attached to that release—for 
instance, a secured or unsecured money bond, or release on personal recognizance. See, e.g., 
Timothy R. Schnacke, Fundamentals of Bail: A Resource Guide for Pretrial Practitioners 
and a Framework for American Pretrial Reform, 2014 NAT’L INST. OF CORR., 2–3, 91–96 
(2014), https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/028360.pdf. [https://perma.cc/BY
6E-XCNK]. 
 5 Testimony by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy on Bail Legislation Before the 
Subcommittees on Constitutional Rights and Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, 88th Cong. (1964) (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney 
General, Department of Justice), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011
/01/20/08-04-1964.pdf [http://perma.cc/9LZL-3E8E]. 
 6 See, e.g., id.; Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Bail Reform Act of 
1966, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 22, 1966), http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27666#axzz2htZwrKnK [http://perma.cc/KWP7-D9CL]; NCJRS, Nat
ional Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, Proceedings of May 27-29, 1964 and 
Interim Report, May 1964-April 1965, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (1965), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pd
ffiles1/Photocopy/355NCJRS.pdf [http://perma.cc/QQ2Y-RC5C] [hereinafter, NCJRS Rep
ort]; Foote, supra note 2. 
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than to their own intuition about who is deserving of pretrial release.7  This 
permits the insertion of discrimination, particularly against the poor and 
black defendants, into the pretrial process.8 
Thus, “first wave” de-incarceration efforts were met by a “second 
wave” (perhaps, more accurately, a powerful undertow), animated by the 
growing concern in the 1970s and 1980s for public safety, the tough-on-
crime rhetoric that politicians adopted in response to that concern, and the 
War on Drugs.  The District of Columbia and the federal government 
passed statutes that authorized judges to detain accused persons in the 
interest of community safety,9 and the courts upheld these laws.10  Many 
other jurisdictions, Illinois among them, followed the same path.11 
This about-face in rhetoric and in policy led to ballooning jail 
populations around the country.12  Black individuals were increasingly 
overrepresented among those held prior to trial.13  Money bail was pressed 
into service as a means to assure public safety.14  Judges imposed bonds 
that accused persons could not possibly pay, knowing that the unattainable 
bonds would keep the defendants incarcerated—even though they were 
presumptively innocent and had never been found, after a proper hearing, to 
pose a danger to anyone.15 
 
 7 See infra notes 101–103, 132, 184, 191. 
 8 See infra notes 26, 190–191, 211–212. 
 9 See District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedures Act of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to -1323 (West 2017)) 
[hereinafter, D.C. ACT]; Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50, 3062 (2012)). 
 10 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding the federal Bail Reform 
Act of 1984); see also United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1322 (D.C. 1981) 
(upholding the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970). 
 11 See infra Section I(B)(4). 
 12 The number of admissions to jails in the United States nearly doubled between 1983 
and 2013, from 6 million to 11.7 million. See Ram Subramanian et al., Incarceration’s Front 
Door: The Misuse of Jails in America, 2015 VERA INST. OF JUST., https://www.vera.org/
publications/incarcerations-front-door-the-misuse-of-jails-in-america 
[https://perma.cc/5YJZ-4D9B]. 
 13 For a more extensive discussion of racial disparities in pretrial administration, see 
infra notes 26, 189–190, 210–211. 
 14 See Mayson, supra note 1, at 507 (Jurisdictions have “continued to rely on money bail 
and sub rosa detention as a crude mechanism for managing pretrial crime risk.”); see also 
SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN 
AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 167 (2018) (“[W]hen judges perceive (based on their 
intuition) that a person presents a high risk, we see those judges setting very high amounts of 
money bail as a means to try to keep that person in jail.”). 
 15 For a discussion of the nation’s ongoing use of both explicit preventive detention 
mechanisms and money bail to detain, see supra Section I(B)(5). 
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The current “third wave” has been driven by an emerging consensus 
across the political spectrum that the decades-long expansion of the 
criminal justice apparatus is cruel, counterproductive, and expensive,16 as 
well as disproportionately harmful to people of color—particularly black 
people.17 
Section II of this Article provides a sketch of the well-established due 
process and equal protection principles that protect the indigent from unjust 
confinement.  It also describes how reformers have recently deployed this 
precedent to attack the pretrial confinement of those who are unable to 
purchase their freedom.  In particular, recent class action lawsuits have 
been able to adapt established constitutional law governing the rights of the 
indigent to new purpose.18  These suits serve as a beacon to future legal 
efforts, even as they provide a stark reminder that much of the country 
continues to use money to manage the purported flight and recidivism risk 
of pretrial defendants.  As Section II recounts, due process and equal 
protection challenges to money bail have enjoyed limited success in the 
current environment.  Their future success, however, remains uncertain. 
 
 16 In 2015, there were 10.9 million admissions to the nation’s jails—most of them 
detained without having been convicted of any offense. See TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES IN 2015 (December 
2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji15.pdf. [http://perma.cc/TW6K-UZ6X]. While 
some individuals are incarcerated for days or weeks, almost 40% of felony defendants in the 
United States will spend the entirety of the pretrial phase incarcerated in jail; nine out of ten 
such detainees will remain locked up solely because of their inability to pay the cash bail 
bond assigned after their arrest. Subramanian et al., supra note 12, at 32 (citing BRIAN A. 
REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN 
LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 1, 15 (December 2013)), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf.) [http://perma.cc/BB2U-MTE8]. There are 
great human costs to this system. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., THE 
ARNOLD FOUNDATION, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 3–4 (2013) (describing 
how the length of pretrial detention is associated with a greater likelihood that the defendant 
will fail to appear for court proceedings and engage in new criminal activity and post-
deposition recidivism); Paul Heaton, et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor 
Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711 (2016) (using empirical evidence from Harris 
County, Texas to measure the negative effects of pretrial detention on criminal case 
outcomes and future crime); Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial 
Disparities in Bail Determinations, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 919, 934–38 (2013) 
(describing the personal and community hardships incurred as a result of pretrial detention, 
including loss of employment, child support, and financial resources, and the harm caused 
by incarceration itself, including as a result of the prevalence of physical and sexual violence 
in jails). 
 17 For a review of scholarship showing the racial disparities in pretrial administration, 
see infra notes 26, 191–92 and 212–13. 
 18 See infra Section II. 
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In Section III, we examine the unfolding results of the “third wave” 
reform efforts nationwide.  Reformers can now point to momentous 
successes.  Jurisdictions throughout the country are moving toward pretrial 
release systems that are not based on wealth.19  In Maryland, New Mexico, 
and Arizona, rules have recently been implemented prohibiting the use of 
cash bonds that the defendant is unable to pay.20  In Cook County, the chief 
judge of the court system has administratively ordered that bonds in all 
cases must be within the defendant’s means.21 
Yet, despite prior and current efforts, the poor and the indigent remain 
locked up in local jails throughout the nation.22  The successes in limiting 
the reliance on money bail have been driven in part by reformers’ 
willingness, in the interest of tactical advantage, to concede that undesirable 
defendants may be restrained on home confinement or on electronic 
monitoring, or even incarcerated on “no bond,” without the possibility of 
release.23  At the same time, pretrial services entities around the country are 
 
 19 See Where Pretrial Improvements are Happening, 2018 PRETRIAL JUST. INST. 4–5, 19, 
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Document
FileKey=0a93999c-5e28-d285-27f7-db3fdabbdfb8&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/8QL6-
8WX9] [hereinafter, Where Pretrial Improvements are Happening]. 
 20 See MD. R. 4-216.1(d)(1)(B), effective July 1, 2017, http://mdcourts.gov/rules/rodocs/
ro192.pdf [http://perma.cc/4KG4-SVWH] (“A judicial officer may not impose a financial 
condition in form or amount that the judicial officer knows or has reason to believe the 
defendant is financially incapable of meeting and that will result in the defendant being 
detained solely because of that financial incapability.”); N.M. R. 5-401(E)(1)(c), effective 
July 1, 2017, http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmrules/NMRules/5-401_6-5-2017.pdf [http://
perma.cc/L8QD-3VX8] (“The court shall not set a secured bond that a defendant cannot 
afford for the purpose of detaining a defendant who is otherwise eligible for pretrial 
release.); ARIZ. R. 7.3(b)(2), effective April 3, 2017, http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/20/
2016%20December%20Rules%20Agenda/R_16_0041.pdf [http://perma.cc/SJ8Y-FR6E] 
(“The court must not impose a monetary condition that results in unnecessary pretrial 
incarceration solely because the person is unable to pay the bond.”). 
 21 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK CTY, GENERAL ORDER NO. 
18.8A – PROCEDURES FOR BAIL HEARINGS AND PRETRIAL RELEASE (July 17, 2017), http://
www.cookcountycourt.org/Manage/DivisionOrders/ViewDivisionOrder/tabid/298/ArticleId/
2562/GENERAL-ORDER-NO-18-8A-Procedures-for-Bail-Hearings-and-Pretrial-
Release.aspx [http://perma.cc/4FUM-RHN5] [hereinafter, GENERAL ORDER]. For a 
discussion of Cook County’s recent reforms, see infra Section III(B). 
 22 See, e.g., Heaton et al., supra note 16, at 713 (The “large majority of pretrial detainees 
[nationwide] are detained because they cannot afford their bail, which is often a few 
thousand dollars or less.”); BAUGHMAN, supra note 14, at 166–67 (In 1990, 53% of felony 
defendants were assigned financial conditions of release; by 2009, 72% of felony defendants 
were assigned money bail. Moreover, the average bail amount increased 46% in this time 
period. Baughman concludes that such statistics “provide a glimpse into how the widespread 
use of money bail is being applied to a defendant, both for serious and nonserious crimes.”) 
 23 See infra Section III(A). In many reform jurisdictions, the use of highly intrusive 
methods of release, including GPS tracking and electronic monitoring, has increased. See 
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increasingly relying on predictive models to assess the risk posed by the 
release of individual defendants.24  These models risk normalizing and 
enhancing the practice of “preventive detention.” 
We view some of these trends with alarm.  Skepticism is warranted 
when the discriminatory money bail system is traded for a remade pretrial 
release program premised on the identification of a cadre of defendants who 
are purported to present a threat to society and are thus subject to some 
form of preventive detention.25  Cash-based pretrial incarceration should 
not be replaced by a more well-honed detention system, whether by 
electronic monitoring or full-scale detention.  We see a risk that the latest 
set of bail reforms will widen the net of detention by failing to fully 
eradicate the traditional money bail system while also encouraging more 
intentional forms of preventive detention. 
Accordingly, the final section of the Article suggests a set of baselines 
on which reformers must insist to create a just system of pretrial release.  
Under this system, courts default to pretrial release of those charged with 
crimes and provide those individuals with support to help prevent failures 
to appear in court and mitigate recidivism.  While this model is not without 
some societal risk, we posit that, in the end, it is the only tolerable outcome 
 
Avlana K. Eisenberg, Mass Monitoring, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 153 (2017) (summarizing 
detractors’ arguments that the “booming” business of electronic monitoring only adds 
another condition of release upon those who should otherwise be freed on their own 
recognizance); Kate Weisburd, Monitoring Youth: The Collison of Rights and 
Rehabilitation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 297, 309–11 (2015) (describing the general rise in 
popularity of electronic monitoring as an alternative to pre- and post-trial incarceration); 
Samuel Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L. J. 1344, 
1367–671 (2014) (describing use of electronic monitoring and GPS tracking pretrial models 
in various states); Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1399, 1478 n.250 (2017) (noting that the number of individuals tracked via electronic 
monitoring has more than doubled in the past ten years); PEW Charitable Trusts, Use of 
Electronic Offender-Tracking Devices Expands Sharply (Sept. 07, 2016), http://www
.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2016/09/use-of-electronic-offender-
tracking-devices-expands-sharply [http://perma.cc/N747-CYR9] (noting a 140% increase in 
the number of accused and convicted people being monitored with electronic devices 
between 2005 and 2015). 
 24 See infra Section III (A). 
 25 Indeed, the Pretrial Justice Institute, an advocacy organization dedicated to ensuring 
more fair adjudication in pretrial decision-making, authored a report acknowledging that in a 
pretrial system that did not rely on money bail, at least 10% of pretrial detainees would be 
incarcerated without bond. See What Pretrial Systems Look Like Without Money Bail, 
PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST. 3–5 https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/Download
DocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=9f7cfb09-0f95-b3e4-2e03-1fa92fb102a
d&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/A8UC-UNZS]. 
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under our constitutional system and in light of the formal understanding of 
bail in this country. 
I. THE HISTORY OF CASH BAIL REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN 
ILLINOIS 
Understanding the state of America’s bail system today requires a 
brief analysis of the origins of the jurisprudence and rights undergirding the 
pretrial release process.  This inquiry begins, in Section A, with a review of 
the early American bail scheme.  We then turn, in Sections B(1) and (2), to 
a description of the transformation of this system over time from one 
primarily of pretrial release to one of pretrial detention, with wealth as the 
defining arbiter of a charged person’s freedom.  In the remaining subparts 
of Section B, we describe the reform efforts of the mid-twentieth century 
(the “first wave” of bail reform) and the countervailing movement to 
toughen detention rules that followed (the “second wave”). 
In sum, previous campaigns to change the system have been unable to 
dislodge an entrenched reliance on judicial custom that includes the 
assignment of monetary bail, as the mostly failed first wave efforts 
demonstrate.  As a result, bond administration in this country continues to 
be characterized by the over-incarceration of the poor and the disparate 
treatment of people of color—particularly black people.26  There is a 
significant risk that prospective efforts at reform will be similarly hobbled.  
Worse, in jurisdictions where financial conditions have become less central 
to the pretrial process (a key tenet of recent reforms), the balance has tipped 
toward a greater acceptance of preventive detention—a widening of the net 
that does not necessarily represent a liberalization of the bail process.27 
 
 26 See Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, 
and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 
201–02 (2018) (Across the country, “less than 25 percent of felony defendants are released 
without financial conditions and the typical felony defendant is assigned a bail amount of 
more than $55,000.” Additionally, the authors’ data showed that the “typical defendant” 
earned less than $7,000 annually in the year prior to arrest, “likely explaining why less than 
50 percent of defendants are able to post bail even when it is set at $5,000 or less.”); 
Subramanian et al., supra note 12, at 15 (noting that black men are held disproportionately 
pretrial as a result of their inability to post monetary bond, a cyclical problem: “Although 
their bail amounts are similar to bail amounts set for whites, black men appear to be caught 
in a cycle of disadvantage. Because they are incarcerated at higher rates they are more likely 
to be unemployed and/or in debt, resulting in more trouble posting bail.”). For a more 
extensive discussion of racial disparities in pretrial administration, see infra notes 189–190 
and 210–211. 
 27 See supra Section III(A). 
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As Malcolm X famously stated, “[o]f all our studies, history is best 
qualified to reward our research.”28  Criminal justice advocates and 
stakeholders should pay heed to the lessons of history, so that future 
changes do not, unintentionally or otherwise, widen the carceral net. 
A. THE BAIL EXPERIENCE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 
In the colonial era, bail was generally synonymous with release.29  The 
early American system of bail administration derived heavily from key 
principles of English bail law—most notably, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas 
Corpus Act, and the Petition of Right30—but applied them more liberally.31  
Over time, however, the pretrial release process in the United States 
diverged from its English roots in ways (both positive and negative) that 
had a lasting impact both on the country’s bail system and future reform 
efforts.32 
Drafted in 1641, prior even to the English Bill of Rights, the 
Massachusetts Body of Liberties created an unequivocal right to bail for 
non-capital offenses, regardless of the evidence or the accused’s character.33  
 
 28 Malcolm X, Message to the Grassroots (Nov. 10, 1963), http://teachingamerican
history.org/library/document/message-to-grassroots// [http://perma.cc/66R2-37NE]. 
 29 June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic 
Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 530–31 (1983); see also 
Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 909, 920 (2013) (stating that the right to bail articulated at the end of the seventeenth 
century was “absolute and unequivocal.”). 
 30 Professor and criminal justice scholar Caleb Foote famously described the Bill of 
Rights, Habeas Corpus Act, and the Petition of Right as the “three-legged stool” of English 
bail law. Foote, supra note 2, at 696; see also Hegreness, supra note 29, at 917–18 (“The 
Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act, and the English Bill of Rights are three great 
pillars of bail that emerged from the constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century.”). 
For a thorough discussion of these three laws, their origins, and their later adoption within 
the American system, see William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 
ALB. L. REV. 33 (1977); Carbone, supra note 29, at 519–533. 
 31 Carbone, supra note 29, at 530–31. Carbone noted that the most significant departure 
of colonial bail practice from English law was the recognition of a right to bail “no matter 
how great the evidence or how infamous the accused[.]” Id. at 531. 
 32 For instance, while personal character evidence was not imported from England into 
early colonial bail administration, id. at 530–31, neither was a constitutional right of pretrial 
release (see infra note 40), which has subsequently hobbled efforts by legal reformers to 
achieve a constitutional recognition of a right to bail, regardless of financial ability. See infra 
Section I(B)(2). 
 33 Carbone, supra note 29, at 530 (citing THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS § 8, 
at 37 (W. Whitmore ed. 1889)). But see Foote, supra note 2, at 981 (stating that the 
“theoretical liberality” of the Massachusetts bail statute “should not be overdrawn,” for the 
colony punished by death non-bailable offenses that included “idolatry, witchcraft, 
blasphemy, bestiality, sodomy, adultery . . . [and] stubbornness or rebelliousness on the part 
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In 1682, Pennsylvania adopted a colonial charter providing that “all 
Prisoners shall be Bailable by Sufficient Sureties unless for capital 
Offenses, where proof is evident or the presumption great.”34  The 
Pennsylvania Frame Government further liberalized the bail decision by 
limiting capital crimes to “willful murder,” which had the effect of 
expanding the right to bail beyond that ever recognized in Massachusetts or 
England.35  The rights of those charged with offenses were further codified 
in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, passed just two years before the 
American Bill of Rights was debated in Congress, which stated, similarly, 
that “all persons shall be bailable, unless for capital offences, where the 
proof shall be evident, or the presumption great.”36  This language, 
conferring an almost universal right to bail, was later adapted into many 
state constitutions after the official founding of the country.37  It was also 
adopted into federal law.  The Judiciary Act of 1789, passed while 
Congress was simultaneously considering the Bill of Rights, borrowed 
heavily from the Pennsylvania colonial constitution.38  Accordingly, even 
those charged with capital offenses could, in theory, seek pretrial release.  
Moreover, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, sureties were paid 
only upon default, so that wealth did not factor directly into release 
decisions.39 
Despite these auspicious beginnings, the final expression of the 
country’s federal pretrial policy—the Constitution of the United States—
 
of a son against his parents.”) (citing George Lee Haskins, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY 
MASSACHUSETTS: A STUDY IN TRADITION AND DESIGN 145–46 (1960)). 
 34 Carbone, supra note 29, at 531; see also Hegreness, supra note 29, at 920 (citing 
FRAME OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA OF 1682, art. XI, reprinted in 5 Thorpe, THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3061 
(1906)). 
 35 Carbone, supra note 29, at 531–32. 
 36 Foote, supra note 2, at 970 (citing An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory 
of the United States North-West of the River Ohio, July 13, 1787, art. ii). Foote 
acknowledged that, in prohibiting the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishment”, the 
Northwestern Ordinance adopted language not only from Pennsylvania, but also from the 
English Bill of Rights. Id. at 987. 
 37 Carbone, supra note 29, at 532. 
 38 Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of 1984: The 
Loss of the Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 36 FORDHAM URB. 
L. J. 121, 129–30 (2009) (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (2006)) (“[U]pon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be 
admitted, except where the punishment may be death, in which cases it shall not be admitted 
but by the supreme or a circuit court, or by a justice of the supreme court, or a judge of a 
district court, who shall exercise their discretion therein, regarding the nature and 
circumstances of the offence, and of the evidence, and the usages of law.”). 
 39 See infra Section I(B)(1). 
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was drafted with no unequivocal right to bail.40  The Constitution lacks 
reference to the colonial model of bail or even to the language of the 
English Statute of Westminster, which included at least a limited right to 
pretrial release for certain classes of defendants.41  Rather, bail decisions are 
explicitly circumscribed only by the restriction against the suspension of the 
writ of Habeas Corpus in Article I, section 9 of the Constitution, and by the 
Eighth Amendment’s safeguards against the imposition of excessive bail, 
adopted directly from the English Bill of Rights.42  While the spare prose of 
the Eighth Amendment has sparked debate in the academy and the courts as 
to whether it implies some right to pretrial release, the judicial consensus 
has been against reading such a right into the text.43 
 
 40 See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952); see also Charles E. Ares et al., The 
Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 67, 70 (1963); Hegreness, supra note 29, at 946. 
 41 See Carbone, supra note 29, at 529. Carbone noted that whether the Statute of 
Westminster actually provided a “right to bail” is open to interpretation given that it only 
required the pretrial release of a specific set of defendants who were charged with minor 
crimes or whose guilt was uncertain. 
 42 See Wiseman, supra note 38, at 127–28. 
 43 Professor Foote famously argued that, though the language of the excessive bail 
clause was ambiguous, a reading of the historical circumstances surrounding its passage by 
the first Congress “argue against giving it a narrow reading.” Foote, supra note 2, at 989. 
Foote concluded that the clause was “intended to afford protection against pretrial 
imprisonment in a broad category of cases” id., and that the omission of such rights-granting 
language was a result of inadvertence, id. at 987. The American judiciary has held otherwise. 
See Carlson, 342 U.S. at 545–56 (“The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress from 
defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this country. Thus in criminal 
cases bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be death. Indeed, the very language 
of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable. We think, clearly, here that the 
Eighth Amendment does not require that bail be allowed under the circumstances of these 
cases.”); see also United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1329 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981) 
(citing but rejecting Foote’s argument that “the narrowly drawn excessive bail clause was 
the product of oversight.”). But see Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1952) (suggesting in 
dictum that there may be a right to bail pursuant to the Eighth Amendment) and Carlson, 
342 U.S. at 569 (Burton, J. dissenting) (“The Amendment cannot well mean that, on the one 
hand, it prohibits the requirement of bail so excessive in amount as to be unattainable, yet, 
on the other hand, under like circumstances, it does not prohibit the denial of bail, which 
comes to the same thing.”). Other scholars have also argued against Foote’s conclusion. See 
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical 
Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 338 (1982) (“The central flaw in the historical 
argument for an eighth amendment right to bail is simply that the amendment does not 
explicitly grant this right. The framers’ failure to include a right to bail provision in the 
Constitution might evidence a specific intent not to raise this right to the level of 
constitutional protection, but to leave the matter to the discretion of Congress.”). For an 
overview of the competing positions on the meaning of the Eighth Amendment propounded 
during the mid-twentieth century and leading up to the passage of the Bail Reform Act of 
1984, see Wiseman, supra note 38, at 135–138 (“The Excessive Bail Clause became a focus 
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The absence of an explicit constitutional right to pretrial release has 
had enormous consequences for those charged with crimes in this country, 
as well as for advocates seeking recognition of the right to pretrial release.  
The failure of the Founders to provide unambiguous support for this right 
has also enabled the creation and expansion of the system of “money 
bond,” which remains the target of modern day bail reform efforts. 
B. PRETRIAL RELEASE AND BAIL REFORM EFFORTS IN THE 
“MODERN” AGE 
1. The Emergence of the “Money Bond” System 
Though the federal constitution did not include a right to bail, most 
state constitutions from the early days of the republic did include a right to 
bail.44  These state laws mirrored the language in Pennsylvania’s Frame 
Government in that they adopted a presumption of release for non-capital 
offenses upon the receipt of “sufficient sureties.”45  Thus, reliance on 
sureties became a quintessential feature of pretrial justice in this country,46 
and remains so today.47 
What has changed is the nature of the surety system.48  The old system 
functioned without prepayment; the guarantee was paid only upon the 
defendant’s default.49  Most sureties were provided by an individual who 
 
of scholarly interest in the 1960s as a result of the possibilities created by the Supreme 
Court’s new authority over state criminal procedure through the doctrine of incorporation.”). 
 44 See Hegreness, supra note 29, at 921–22 (conducting comparison of state 
constitutions and statutory schemes to find that from the post-colonial history until the 
twentieth century, 42 states had adopted an unequivocal right to bail clause). Hegreness 
describes the consistency of what he coins the “Consensus Right to Bail Clause” in most 
state constitutions, the language of which is: “All persons shall be bailable by sufficient 
sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great.” Id. 
at 924; see also id app., describing the “right to bail clauses” in state constitutions and 
amendments, 1776 to 2013. 
 45 Foote, supra note 2, at 975. 
 46 Carbone, supra note 29, at 540 (“[O]nce the right to bail was extended to all but the 
occasional defendant indicted for a capital offense, the amount of bail, rather than the fact of 
bail, became the most important determinant of pretrial release or detention.”). 
 47 See BAUGHMAN, supra note 14, at 46 (asserting that cash bail is still “the most 
common pretrial release method” in the United States). 
 48 A surety is, in general terms, the party that retains liability for paying another’s debt 
or performing another’s obligations, i.e., a joint obligor. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). In the bail context, a surety may be either commercial (e.g., a 
bailbondsman) or noncommercial. Schnacke, supra note 4, at 2. 
 49 Timothy R. Schnacke, Money as a Criminal Justice Stakeholder, 2014 NAT’L INST. OF 
CORR. 24, https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/029517.pdf [https://perma.cc
/JN59-U9BB]; see also Carbone, supra note 29, at 519–20 (describing the Anglo-Saxon bail 
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had a personal relationship with the defendant, and who was willing to take 
responsibility for ensuring the accused’s return to court.50  This third-party 
assurance, adopted from English law,51 became a key tenet of the early 
American bail experience, as evidenced by eighteenth-century 
jurisprudence that affirmed the right of a personal surety to arrest his debtor 
and return him to court.52 
As the nineteenth century progressed, the nature of bail administration 
changed, largely as a result of the nation’s changing demographics.  The 
United States became more geographically dispersed; the population 
expanded across the frontier and into urban areas, fracturing community 
ties, and precipitating a decline in the availability of unsecured personal 
sureties.53  Defendants were left to pay bonds themselves—or to languish in 
jail.54  These circumstances gave rise to the creation of the commercial bail 
bond industry, which remains pervasive in the vast majority of states today 
 
system as one in which the surety represented the total amount sought as relief, a warranty 
for the accused appearing in any future proceedings, and if the accused fled, the bail amount 
was paid as a default judgment by the third-party guarantor). 
 50 Schnacke, supra note 49, at 24; see also Paul Lermack, The Law of Recognizances in 
Colonial Pennsylvania, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 475, 505 (1977) (noting that in colonial Pennsylvania, 
“few defendants had trouble finding sureties.”); cf. Duker, supra note 30, at 70 (describing 
the English concept of the “private jailer,” whereby the person providing the bail would be 
“interested in looking after and, if necessary, exercising the legal powers he has to prevent 
the accused from disappearing.”) (citing Consol. Expl. and Fin. Co. v. Musgrave, 1 Ch. 37 
(1899)) 
 51 Duker, supra note 30, at 70–71; see also Carbone, supra note 29, at 520. 
 52 Reese v. United States, 76 U.S. 13, 21 (1869) (“By a recognizance of bail in a 
criminal action the principal is, in the theory of the law, committed to the custody of the 
sureties as to jailers of his own choosing, not that he is subjected or can be subjected by 
them to constant imprisonment, but that he is so far placed in their power that they may at 
any time arrest him upon the recognizance and surrender him to the court, and, to the extent 
necessary to accomplish this, may restrain him of his liberty.”); see also Taylor v. Taintor, 
83 U.S. 366, 371 (1872) (“When bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to the 
custody of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the original imprisonment. 
Whenever they choose to do so, they may seize him and deliver him up in their discharge; 
and if that cannot be done at once, they may imprison him until it can be done. They may 
exercise their rights in person or by agent. They may pursue him into another State; may 
arrest him on the Sabbath; and, if necessary, may break and enter his house for that purpose. 
The seizure is not made by virtue of new process. None is needed. It is likened to the rearrest 
by the sheriff of an escaping prisoner.”). 
 53 Duker, supra note 30, at 95–96; Schnacke, supra note 49, at 24. 
 54 Duker, supra note 30, at 96; Schnacke, supra note 49, at 24–25; see also BEELEY, 
infra note 65, at 162–63 (“With urbanization has come a form of social organization which 
the bail law as originally administered is unable to deal with. Anonymity has taken the place 
of intimacy in present-day social relationships, with the result . . . that the failure of an 
accused person to provide security for bail can no longer be regarded a conclusive proof of 
his general reliability . . . [I]t may mean that he is merely unknown and poor.”). 
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(though not in Illinois).55  The Supreme Court acknowledged the changing 
landscape in Leary v. United States, stating that the “distinction between 
bail and suretyship is pretty nearly forgotten . . . [for] [t]he interest to 
produce the body of the principal in court is impersonal and wholly 
pecuniary.”56 
The emergent commercial industry allowed individuals to “bail out” 
even if lacking a personal surety or the requisite funds, but there were costs 
involved.  A defendant seeking the services of a bail insurance company 
often had to pay a fee up front and provide collateral on the bond.57  This is 
still the common practice in most jurisdictions, where families frequently 
bear the brunt of the expense.58  The creation of the bail bond industry, 
 
 55 Ares et al., supra note 40, at 69; Carbone, supra note 29, at 550 n.169 (noting that the 
change to a commercial bond system “increased the importance of consideration of the 
defendant’s financial means”); Duker, supra note 30, at 96; Schnacke, supra note 49, at 25–
27. Currently, only Oregon, Kentucky, Wisconsin and Illinois have a legal ban on the 
commercial bail bond industry. See Pretrial Release Conditions, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-rele
ase-conditions.aspx#/ [http://perma.cc/LD8J-Y5A7]; Thanithia Billings, Private Interest, 
Public Sphere: Eliminating the Use of Commercial Bail Bondsmen, 57 B.C . L. REV. 1337, 
1355 (2016). Illinois outlawed the industry in 1963, and replaced it with a monetary pretrial 
system administered by the courts. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 359 (1971) (“Prior to 
1964 the professional bail bondsman system with all its abuses was in full and odorous 
bloom in Illinois. . . . One of the stated purposes of the new bail provisions in the 1963 Code 
was to rectify this offensive situation. The purpose appears to have been accomplished.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 56 224 U.S. 567, 575–76 (1912). 
 57 Ares et al., supra note 40, at 69; Schnacke, supra note 49, at 26. 
 58 Indeed, the monetary system of pretrial release imposes inexorable costs on families 
and communities. See Norman L. Reimer, Limited Resources May Present Unlimited 
Opportunities for Reform, THE CHAMPION March 2011, at 9, 10 (2011); see also Wiseman, 
Right to be Monitored, supra note 23, at 1360–61 (detailing how families expend funds on 
bail that would otherwise cover basic living necessities); JUSTICE POLICY INST., FOR BETTER 
OR FOR PROFIT: HOW THE BAIL BONDING INDUSTRY STANDS IN THE WAY OF FAIR AND 
EFFECTIVE PRETRIAL JUSTICE 15 (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/
documents/_for_better_or_for_profit_.pdf [http://perma.cc/2NGK-VZZY]. Courts, however, 
have not been sympathetic to the plight of family members who lose personal funds through 
the system’s operation, as evident in a line of Illinois cases. See, e.g., People v. Chaney, 628 
N.E.2d 944 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (State was entitled to bond forfeiture judgment despite 
financial hardship to defendant’s mother, who had mortgaged her house to pay the bond) 
(“Donna Chaney’s hardship, in having to repay borrowed funds, does not ameliorate the risk 
she knowingly assumed, nor is it a legal justification to divest the State of its right to 
judgment mandated by the bail bond and the Code under the facts and circumstances of this 
case.”); People v. Cox, 363 N.E.2d 389 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); People v. Lowder, 316 N.E.2d 
150 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); People v. Dabbs, 321 N.E.2d 185 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974). 
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nearly the only one of its kind in the world,59 in conjunction with a new 
reliance on “secured” bonds requiring payment prior to release, helped to 
foster the conditions of pretrial detention that have precipitated the need for 
the current reforms.60 
The development of the pernicious bail bond industry is just one 
example of how the country’s pretrial system has morphed into the 
discriminatory structure it is today.  While ostensibly providing a way for 
poor people to pay their way out of jail, the entrenched customary practice 
has also worked to the disadvantage of indigent defendants.  From the early 
days of the modern bail age, the rights-creating documents pertaining to 
pretrial release (e.g., state constitutions and federal law) and the actual 
experiences of those in the justice system began to diverge.  If one were to 
consider only the written text concerning bail in most state statutes and 
constitutions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it would 
appear that the individual right to pretrial liberty was assured and 
expansive.61  The facts on the ground tell a very different story.62  Instead, 
the “modern” American bail system, like the criminal justice system more 
generally, targeted and incarcerated the poor and minorities to their and 
 
 59 The Philippines is the only other country in the world to allow a commercial bond 
industry. See Schnacke, supra note 49, at 26 (citing F.E. DEVINE, COMMERCIAL BAIL 
BONDING: A COMPARISON OF COMMON LAW ALTERNATIVES, 6–7 (1991)). 
 60 See TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, CENTER FOR LEGAL AND EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICE, 
“MODEL” BAIL LAWS: RE-DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN PRETRIAL RELEASE AND DETENTION 
29 (Apr. 18, 2017), http://www.clebp.org/images/04-18-2017_Model_Bail_Laws_CLEPB
_.pdf [http://perma.cc/4VD9-Y7AS] (“The change from personal to commercial sureties was 
designed to help get bailable defendants out of jail, but the new model also had one 
important unintended consequence, which was that it forever changed the essential nature of 
the financial condition of release.”). Professor Foote observed that the bail bond industry 
provided little benefit to the state, which retained responsibility for ensuring the accused’s 
presence in court while the bondsman recouped the fee. Accordingly, “the indigent 
defendant is jailed for inability to put up the fee for the purchase of something which renders 
no service to the state.” Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: II, 113 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1125, 1337 (1965). 
 61 See generally Hegreness, supra note 29. 
 62 For instance, attorney Matthew Hegreness conducted an analysis of state constitutions 
spanning from 1776 to 2013, and based upon these texts, concluded that it was not until the 
last half century, particularly starting in the 1970s, that the right to bail in America began to 
erode. See Hegreness, supra note 29, at 956. But this argument, which relies solely on 
statutory and constitutional interpretations of bail clauses, fails to take into account the 
practical administration of bail schemes, which have been dysfunctional and discriminatory 
from at least the mid-19th century. Professor Foote made this very observation, stating that 
while historically the United States’ “paper rights” tended to “cast us in a very liberal light,” 
in reality, the practices of bail administration were “quite repressive.” Foote, supra note 2, at 
980. 
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their families’ detriment.63  In this way, the history of bond in America 
illustrates a clear example of legal realism in action.64 
One of the first empirical analyses of the injustices of the bond system 
was published using data from Chicago. Arthur L. Beeley conducted a 
seminal study of the bail and detention practices in Cook County in 1927, 
rendering conclusions that had wide-reaching influence on future pretrial 
reform efforts.  Beeley found that most defendants remained in the Cook 
County Jail, not because they were considered any great flight risk, but 
because they could not afford bail: 
The amount of bail in a given case is determined arbitrarily and with little or no 
regard to the personality, the social history and financial ability of the accused or the 
integrity and capacity of his sureties.  Bail is too often excessive . . .  The local policy 
of standardizing the amount of bail according to the offense charged is diametrically 
opposed to the spirit and purpose of the bail law.65 
 
 63 See infra notes 26, 190–92 and 212–13. Of course, discrimination against people of 
color, and especially against black people, in the pretrial system was nothing new. Even at 
the time the liberal Pennsylvania Frame Government was adopted, which limited capital 
offenses to willful murder for white men, black men charged with rape, bestiality and 
burglary could be executed and therefore were not entitled to bail. See Carbone, supra note 
29, at 531 n.69. 
 64 Prominent jurisprudential scholar Karl Llewellyn described legal realism as an 
intellectual movement, in which realists “want to check [legal] ideas, and rules, and formulas 
by facts, to keep them close to the facts . . . .[Legal realists] suspect, with law moving slowly 
and the life around them moving fast, that some law may have gotten out of joint with life.” 
Note, Legal Realism and the Race Question: Some Realism About Realism on Race 
Relations, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1607, 1609 (1995) (alterations in original). The teachings of 
legal realism are particularly relevant to the issue of bail reform. The viewpoint emerged, 
with an emphasis on the field of criminal law, in the 1920s. It represented a backlash against 
the legal profession’s erstwhile fixation with appellate law and doctrine, which had little to 
say about most laypersons’ experiences with the nation’s justice system, including the 
administration of bail and pretrial release. Former Yale Law School Dean, Abraham S. 
Goldstein, explained it this way: “To most observers, the content of criminal law and the 
elements of criminal liability seemed less important, in practical terms, than the manner in 
which the law was administered: how police and prosecutors exercise their discretion to 
charge; the extent to which the bail decision may be administered in disregard of legal 
norms; the remarkable degree to which the guilty plea dominates the system and is itself 
often dominated by ‘plea bargaining’ between the parties; the attitudes, perceptions, and 
value systems of the decision-makers and of the persons affected by them.” Abraham S. 
Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal 
Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1974). 
 65 ARTHUR L. BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO 155 (1927). Beeley’s words called 
forth the proclamation of another famous reformer, also on the topic of Cook County’s 
system of justice in the early 20th century. Clarence Darrow, addressing prisoners in the Jail 
in 1902, declared that courts were “not instruments of justice[,]” for “when your case gets 
into court it will make little differen[ce] whether you are guilty or innocent . . . . First and 
last it’s a question of money.” Clarence Darrow, Crime and Criminals: An Address 
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The adverse effects of what Beeley deemed to be excessive bail served 
as the impetus for bail studies, projects, and legislative action geared 
toward reforming the bail system throughout the last century.66 
Beeley’s seminal study focused on a random sample of 170 detainees 
in the Cook County Jail.67  He divided the sample into two groups—whom 
he termed “dependables” and “undependables”—qualitative assessments 
based on whether a defendant was likely to appear in court, the current 
charge, the defendant’s “personal characteristics” (such as intelligence and 
education) and his “social history” (e.g., family stability and 
employment).68  Beeley followed the progression of his sample groups 
through the court system and determined that the bail scheme was not 
operating as it should.  In particular, many more so-called “dependables” 
were being detained pretrial than necessary; further, over-detention was 
largely a result of defendants’ poverty.69 
While many of Beeley’s assumptions about the releasability of 
detainees have since been empirically undermined,70 and though he relied 
upon certain qualitative and thus likely unreliable determinations about who 
should be “bailable,”71 Beeley’s documented findings about the arbitrary 
imposition of pretrial detention and its negative effects on the poor were the 
same that spurred later bond projects and reform efforts.72  Beeley endorsed 
 
Delivered to the Prisoners in the Chicago County Jail 20–21 (1910), https://archive.org/
details/2917177.0001.001.umich.edu [https://perma.cc/7N2W-3G8L]. 
 66 See infra Section I(B)(3) for a discussion of “first wave” reform efforts. 
 67 BEELEY, supra note 65, at 63. 
 68 Id. at 75–76, 155. 
 69 Id. at 159. “That there are persons committed to Jail for failure to provide sureties, 
who might safely and easily be allowed their freedom pending trial, is a fact which seems 
fully established by this inquiry . . . . [T]he number of such persons is large enough to 
warrant a drastic revision of the Chicago bail policy, in the interests of justice and 
economy.” See also id. at 160 (“As criminal justice is at present administered in Chicago . . . 
large numbers of accused, but obviously dependable persons are needlessly committed to 
Jail[.]” Beeley’s study said little about the racial disparities in pretrial detention. That is also 
possibly a function of the demographics of the Cook County Jail at that time. Beeley noted 
that the “unsentenced Jail population is made up largely of young men, most of whom are 
white, native born, and single.” Id. at 157. Of course, the Cook County Jail population looks 
very different today. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747. 
 70 Including, for instance, his belief that those charged with minor crimes were more 
likely to appear in court, see BEELEY, supra note 65, at 78, an assumption that has since been 
disproven. See Schnacke, supra note 60, at 62, 68–72.  
 71 These were based on his staff’s personal assessments of a detainee’s intelligence or 
personal character. See BEELEY, supra note 65, at 77. 
 72 See John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 
76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3, n.7, n.9, and 13 (1985). 
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a greater reliance on release on personal recognizance73 (“ROR”) and 
summonses in lieu of arrests,74 both of which were virtually nonexistent in 
practice at the time of his study but that continue to be part of the broader 
discourse surrounding pretrial release today.75 
2. Judicial Attitudes Toward “Excessiveness” in Bond Setting and the 
Impact on the Incarceration of the Poor 
The conditions Beeley described were made worse by a line of judicial 
decisions addressing the inscrutable question of what constituted “excessive 
bond.”  The inscrutable answer: bail that a defendant could not afford was 
not excessive, as long as the amount itself was “reasonable.”76  According 
to such precedent, it was not deemed to run afoul of either constitutional or 
state law if an individual remained locked up solely because of his 
indigence.  In 1820, Chief Judge Spencer of New York scoffed at the 
suggestion that wealth-based incarceration was unfairly discriminatory: 
It was urged that the adoption of such a principle would, in its operation, induce to the 
bailing of such persons as were either affluent themselves, or had such influential 
friends; whilst it would leave those who were poor and friendless in prison.  Such 
may be the consequence, but it by no means proves the impropriety of the procedure.  
The rule is adapted to all who can comply with its terms; and it is the misfortune of 
those who cannot give the necesary [sic] security.77 
Fifteen years later, in United States v. Lawrence, a federal D.C. court 
weighed in on the proper bail for a defendant accused of attempting to 
assassinate President Andrew Jackson.78  The trial court judge initially set a 
$1,000 bond on the grounds that “the constitution forbade [the magistrate] 
to require excessive bail; and that to require larger bail than the prisoner 
could give would be to require excessive bail, and to deny bail in a case 
clearly bailable by law.”79  Yet, after the government objected, the court 
raised the bond amount to $1,500 on the grounds that “the discretion of the 
magistrate in taking bail in a criminal case, is to be guided by the 
 
 73 Meaning, pretrial release without monetary conditions based on a promise to return to 
court. See Schnacke, supra note 49, at 23–24. 
 74 BEELEY, supra note 65, at 166–67. 
 75 See, e.g., CRIM. J. POL’Y PROGRAM, HARV. L., MOVING BEYOND MONEY: A PRIMER ON 
BAIL REFORM (Oct. 2016), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/FINAL-Primer-on-Bail-Refor
m.pdf [http://perma.cc/ENY7-XJ94] [hereinafter, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL PRIMER]. 
 76 Schnacke, supra note 49, at 27. Schnacke refers to these decisions as the line of 
“unfortunate cases.” 
 77 Carbone, supra note 29, at 549 (citing People v. Goodwin, 1 Wheeler’s Crim. 443, 
448 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820)). 
 78 26 F. Cas. 887 (C.C. D.C. 1835); see also Carbone, supra note 29, at 549–50. 
 79 Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. at 887. 
720 VAN BRUNT & BOWMAN [Vol. 108 
compound consideration of the ability of the prisoner to give bail, and the 
atrocity of the offence.”80  In raising the bond amount, the Court held: 
That as the prisoner had some reputable friends who might be disposed to bail him, he 
would require bail in the sum of $1,500.  This sum, if the ability of the prisoner only 
were to be considered is, probably, too large; but if the atrocity of the offence alone 
were considered, might seem too small; but taking both into consideration, and that 
the punishment can only be fine and imprisonment, it seemed to him to be as high as 
he ought to require.81 
The reasoning in Lawrence is typical of bail decisions over the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  The holdings pay some lip-service to 
the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and the notion that bail not be 
“excessive,” yet simultaneously approve the detention of indigent, 
criminally-accused persons who lack “reputable friends.”82  These decisions 
appear blind to the inherent arbitrariness of the wealth-based system that 
they endorse.83 
Even when courts did take into account the ability of the accused to 
pay the assigned bond, indigence was not considered a barrier to the 
ordering of financial conditions of release.  Rather, “pecuniary 
circumstance” was only one designated factor of many to consider in the 
administration of bail.84  (Indeed, certain court decisions proffered the 
 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 887–89. The defendant in Lawrence could not pay the bond amount in the case, 
however, the issue of bond became irrelevant when the defendant was committed on grounds 
of insanity. See Foote, supra note 2, at 992. 
 82 See, e.g., United States v. Rumrich, 180 F.2d 575, 576 (2d Cir. 1950) (per curiam) (“A 
person arrested upon a criminal charge, who cannot give bail, has no recourse but to move 
for trial. If upon the return of such a motion the court should deny him the speedy trial to 
which the Constitution entitles him, it may be that he should be released on habeas corpus-
we need not say.”); People ex. rel. Fraser v. Britt, 43 N.E.2d 836 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1942) 
(affirming denial of application for bail in abortion case in which defendant claimed 
excessive bail). The reference to “reputable friends” is taken from Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 887; 
Delaney v. Shobe, 346 P.2d 126 (Or. 1959) (per curiam) (in case alleging excessive bail of 
$15,000 and requesting reduction to no more than $3,000, court denied petition for “the 
mere fact of inability to give bail in the amount set is not sufficient reason for holding the 
amount excessive.”) (citing Ex Parte Paul, 252 P. 853, 854 (Crim. Ct. App. Okla. 1927)). 
 83 Earlier in the 19th century, in contrast, some courts did acknowledge the lack of 
common sense in ascertaining bailability by reference to the size of a defendant’s pocket 
book. As the Illinois Supreme Court stated in 1822: “[I]t does seem to us to be a perversion 
of plain language to say that we must look to the fact of the party’s ability to procure bail, to 
ascertain whether by law he is bailable.” Foley v. People, 1 Ill. 57, 58 (1822). 
 84 See, e.g., Ex parte Duncan, 54 Cal. 75, 77 (Cal. 1879) (recognizing the common law 
“absolute right to be admitted to bail” and the prohibition against excessive bail but finding 
that while “the extent of the pecuniary ability of a prisoner to furnish bail is a circumstance 
among other circumstances to be considered in fixing the amount in which it is to be 
required, but it is not in itself controlling”); Gregory v. State ex rel. Grudgel, 94 Ind. 384, 
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possibility that the poor might be unfairly advantaged by the assignment of 
a reasonable or recognizance bond).85  The seminal case of Sammons v. 
Snow, decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1930, exemplified this 
dissembled approach to cash bond.86  The Court held that it is “not a valid 
objection to the amount of bail required that it is greater than the prisoner is 
able to give, if the bail fixed is not of itself unreasonable in amount, to 
secure his attendance to answer for the crime with which he is charged.”87 
The United States Supreme Court, too, was not immune from issuing 
decisions that decried detention-inducing bond amounts while allowing the 
practice to continue.88  In particular, the Court in Stack v. Boyle articulated 
high ideals of pretrial liberty but provided little in the way of substantive 
rights.89  Stack concerned an Eighth Amendment challenge to the uniform 
setting of $50,000 bond by petitioners accused of conspiring to violate the 
Smith Act.90  The majority noted that there had been no factual showing to 
justify the high bail amount set in the case, a sum “much higher than 
 
388 (Ind. 1884) (“That bail is reasonable which, in view of the nature of the offence, the 
penalty which the law attaches to it, and the probabilities that guilt will be established on the 
trial, seems no more than sufficient to secure the party’s attendance. In determining this, 
some regard should be had to the prisoner’s pecuniary circumstances; that which is 
reasonable bail to a man of wealth being equivalent to a denial of right if exacted of a poor 
man charged with a like offence.”) (citing COOLEY CONST. LIM. (5th ed.) at 378); State ex 
rel. Milliet v. Aucoin, 18 So. 709 (La. 1895) (“The object of giving bond for one’s 
appearance to answer an accusation is for the purpose of securing his attendance, and it 
should be in such an amount as to exact the utmost vigilance on the part of the sureties for 
the appearance, to prevent a forfeiture of the bonds. The amount of the bond should bear a 
proportion to the gravity of the offense, and to the ability of the accused to give it.”); Ex 
parte Malley, 256 P. 512, 514 (Nev. 1927) (overturned on other grounds) (“The ability of 
one charged with a crime to give the bail fixed is an element to be considered in an 
application of this character, but we have the bare statement of counsel to support the 
contention; there is no evidence before us to support it, and, even if there was, we would not 
deem it determinative of the matter, for the real purpose of bail is to assure the presence of 
one charged at all times when demanded.”). But for a strikingly liberal application of the bail 
law in the early 20th century, see Ex parte Bice, 296 S.W. 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 1927), in 
which the court lowered the assigned bail amount, holding that the “ability to make bail is to 
be regarded, and proof may be taken upon this point[,]” for “[t]he power to require bail is 
not to be so used as to make it an instrument of oppression.”). 
 85 See, e.g., In re Scott, 38 Neb. 502, 56 N.W. 1009 (1883) (“We do not question that the 
pecuniary circumstances of a prisoner should be considered, in determining the amount of 
bail. Yet that should not, in itself, control. If it did, a prisoner who is without means or 
friends would be entitled to be discharged on his own recognizance.”). 
 86 People ex rel. Sammons v. Snow, 173 N.E. 8 (Ill. 1930). 
 87 Id. at 9. 
 88 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 3. 
722 VAN BRUNT & BOWMAN [Vol. 108 
usually imposed for offenses with like penalties.”91  The Court dismissed 
the Government’s argument concerning the guilt of the petitioners, stating 
that to “infer from the fact of indictment alone a need for bail in an 
unusually high amount is an arbitrary act . . . [which] would inject into our 
own system of government the very principles of totalitarianism which 
Congress was seeking to guard against . . . .”92  Consequently, the Court 
remanded the case to the district court for factual findings in the setting of 
reasonable bail.93  Yet nowhere does the Court state that inability to pay 
would or should preclude a determination that the bail amount was 
reasonable.  Indeed, in his concurrence, Justice Jackson, who stated that a 
high bail amount assigned to ensure that a defendant remained in jail was 
“contrary to the whole policy and philosophy of bail,” went on to conclude 
that “[t]his is not to say that every defendant is entitled to such bail as he 
can provide, but he is entitled to an opportunity to make it in a reasonable 
amount.”94 
The pronouncements in Stack, delivered in dicta, never created a 
precedential right to affordable bail.95  The subsequent decision in Carlson 
v. Landon, which came down soon after, eradicated any hope of a 
judicially-cognizable right to bail.96  An optimistic examination of Stack 
emphasizes its aspirational language, which extols the notion of a 
defendant’s presumed innocence and the negative ramifications of pretrial 
detention.97  A cynical view of the case suggests that the Court’s pretense to 
constitutional principles obscured its de facto sanctioning of the pretrial 
incarceration of the poor, by affirming the “reasonableness” test in bail-
setting.  Undeniably, the practice of locking up those too poor to pay 
continued in jurisdictions throughout the country. 
 
 91 Id. at 5. 
 92 Id. at 6. 
 93 Id. at 7. 
 94 Id. at 10. 
 95 See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Efficiency and Cost: The Impact of 
Videoconferenced Hearings on Bail Decisions, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 869, 874 
(2010) (“There has never been an occasion for any court to seriously address the disconnect 
between the lofty ideal that the presumptively innocent criminally accused person should not 
be unnecessarily incarcerated before trial, on the one hand, and the highly discriminatory 
effects upon the poor of the institution of bail in practice, on the other.”). 
 96 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. at 545–46 (1952).  
 97 Stack, 342 U.S. at 4 (“Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the 
presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its 
meaning.”). 
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3. The First Wave: The Proliferation of Bail Projects and the Bail 
Reform Act of 1966 
The 1960s ushered in the first national bail reform movement and, 
with it, several projects designed to reduce the number of people being held 
in pretrial detention.  These “bail projects” arose in response to a greater 
public recognition of the nation’s ingrained system of wealth-based pretrial 
incarceration. 
In 1954, Caleb Foote published a study about the administration of 
bail in non-capital cases in Philadelphia.98  His findings echoed those of 
Beeley decades before.  Fifteen percent of the sample Foote analyzed was 
unable to raise sufficient bail to obtain release, even when set at low 
amounts.99  Foote concluded, “the amount of bail will determine whether or 
not an offender will regain his freedom after arrest.”100  Relatedly, he found 
that few judges sought to ascertain the defendant’s financial condition in 
bail proceedings, and that many magistrates used conditions of release in 
order to punish rather than to assure appearance, which was the only valid 
purpose of bail-setting at that time.101  Moreover, in setting bond amounts, 
judges relied heavily on the nature of the offense instead of individualized 
risk factors.102  Professor Foote determined that “[b]ecause custom or 
intuition appears to be the basis of bail determinations, it is difficult to 
ascertain what standards are being applied.”103  This observation would 
prove prescient. 
The seemingly intractable reliance on custom and intuition by the 
judiciary in the assignment of money bond remains one of the foremost 
 
 98 Caleb Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in 
Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1954). 
 99 Id. at 1033. When the assigned bond amount was higher than $1,000, pretrial release 
became the “exception” rather than the norm; at the $1,500 level, a defendant was 4.5 times 
more likely to remain in detention pretrial than at the $400 level. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 1036, 1038. Foote provided numerous examples from his observations of 
Philadelphia bond court of judges setting high bail after expressing disapproval as to the 
nature of the defendant’s charges, and even cited one case where the presiding magistrate 
judge explicitly stated that he felt “the man should be punished” in setting a high bail. Id. at 
1038–39. See also Ares et al., supra note 40, at 71 (noting in 1963 that “[h]gh bail is 
sometimes set to ‘punish’ the defendant or to break crime waves or to keep the defendant off 
the streets until trial.”). 
 102 Foote, supra note 98, at 1070. Foote decried the fact that judges were not conducting 
the sort of individualized analysis he believed was required under Stack v. Boyle, reading 
into that decision a constitutional mandate of individualization in bond administration. Id. 
Whether that is a fair reading of Stack, which is heavy on dicta, remedying the lack of 
individualization became a major goal of mid-20th century bail reform efforts. 
 103 Id. at 1038. 
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roadblocks to reform.  In the 1960s, advocates sought to combat such trends 
and the ensuing over-detention by emphasizing individual bail 
determinations and pretrial “fact-finding.”104  The first of these reform 
efforts was the Manhattan Bail Project, operated by the newly-formed Vera 
Foundation.105  Beginning in 1961, the Project attempted to verify poor 
individuals’ community ties and to provide this information to judicial 
officers overseeing bail, to promote the use of personal recognizance 
release.106  The three-year experiment, during which Vera employees 
interviewed defendants and collected information about their families, prior 
record, employment, school, and residence, led to a significant increase in 
the number of defendants who were granted recognizance release.107  
Further, of the 3,505 defendants who were released without financial 
conditions following Vera’s recommendations, only 1.6% of the total (56 
individuals) failed to appear at their court proceedings.108  These promising 
results led to the spread of other bail projects nationwide.109  They also 
motivated Vera to perfect a scale designed to measure a defendant’s 
likelihood to appear—an early attempt at using “scientific methods” to 
make pretrial predictions.110 
Bail reform gained momentum throughout the decade.  The National 
Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, held in the spring of 1964, 
focused on alternatives to money bail with the purpose of eliminating the 
intentional detention of the poor.111  That summer, Attorney General Robert 
F. Kennedy gave remarks before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the 
discrimination inherent in bail administration, in promotion of new federal 
legislation to solve “an increasingly disturbing problem[]”: 
That problem, simply stated is: the rich man and the poor man do not receive equal 
justice in our courts.  And in no area is this more evident than in the matter of bail.  
 
 104 JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, TWO CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION 
IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 88 (1979). 
 105 For an overview of Vera’s beginnings, see Lee Friedman, The Evolution of a Bail 
Reform, POL’Y SCI. 7, 285–86 (1976). 
 106 Id. at 285, 287. 
 107 Id. at 288–89. 
 108 Id. at 290. 
 109 For a description of these projects, see Friedman, supra note 105, at 301–08. 
 110 See Donna Makowiecki, U.S. Pretrial Services: A Place in History, 76 FED. 
PROBATION 18, 19 (2015). 
 111 See NCJRS Report, supra note 6. The interim report noted that bond projects were 
“proceeding on the philosophy that every defendant, rich or poor, who has sufficient 
community roots should be entitled to release without bail.” Id. at xxvi. It went on to state 
that this point was endorsed by both the Executive Board and in a report of the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittees. 
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Bail has only one purpose—to insure that a person who is accused of a crime will 
appear in court for his trial.  We presume a person to be innocent until he is proven 
guilty, and thus the purpose of bail is not punishment.  It is not harassment.  It is not 
to keep people in jail.  It is simply to guarantee appearance in court.112 
The culmination of this reform movement was the passage of the Bail 
Reform Act of 1966 (“Reform Act”), the first major modification of the bail 
system since the Judiciary Act.113  It provided that “all persons, regardless 
of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained, pending their 
appearance to answer charges, to testify, or pending appeal, when detention 
serves neither the ends of justice nor the public interest.”114  Under the Act, 
defendants were presumptively entitled to release on either personal 
recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond; however, the Act did 
maintain alternatives to ROR, including a provision for the deposit of 
money bond where there was a flight risk.115  The legislation also set forth 
specific factors for setting bail, all of which were designed only to ensure 
the appearance of the defendant at trial.116  At the Act’s signing ceremony, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson remarked upon the revolutionary nature of the 
legislation, which he promised would “begin to insure that defendants are 
considered as individuals—and not as dollar signs.”117 
There is no question that the Reform Act represented a progressive 
step forward.  The rates of release on personal recognizance increased in 
cases throughout the 1970s.118  The new regime disfavored wealth-based 
 
 112 Testimony by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, supra note 4. 
 113 Floralynn Einesman, How Long is Too Long? When Pretrial Detention Violates Due 
Process, 60 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1992). 
 114 See Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (1966). 
 115 Bail Reform Act of 1966, supra note 114; see also Einesman, supra note 113, at 4–5. 
 116 Einesman, supra note 113, at 5. 
 117 Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Bail Reform Act of 1966       
(June 22, 1966), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27666#axzz2htZwrKnK [http://
perma.cc/KWP7-D9CL] (“So today we join to recognize a major development in our entire 
system of criminal justice—the reform of the bail system. This system has endured—
archaic, unjust, and virtually unexamined—ever since the Judiciary Act of 1789. Because of 
the bail system, the scales of justice have been weighted for almost two centuries not with 
fact, nor law, nor mercy. They have been weighted with money. But now, because of the 
Bail Reform Act of 1966, which an understanding and just Congress has enacted and which I 
will shortly sign, we can begin to insure that defendants are considered as individuals—and 
not as dollar signs.”) 
 118 See Candace McCoy, Caleb Was Right: Pretrial Decisions Determine Mostly 
Everything, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM L. 135, 139–40 (2007) (“Like all highly-touted reforms, 
ROR programs achieved much of what was intended (a significantly higher proportion of 
people who used to be held in jail pretrial were instead released on ROR or posted ten 
percent bonds funded by the court and not bondsmen) but fell far short of one of their major 
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distinctions in pretrial administration, and emphasized the importance of 
individualized decision-making in bail setting.119  These changes gave rise 
to the first pretrial services agencies, beginning in Washington, D.C., which 
collected personal information from defendants to make pretrial release 
recommendations to the court.120  Such developments were linked to the 
experimentation and success of the bail reform projects at the local level.121 
Nonetheless, as demonstrated earlier in the nineteenth century, when 
pretrial detention trends bore little relation to the guarantees of liberty in 
progressive state constitutions,122 aspirational language alone could not 
change practices on the ground.  The risk that judicial officers and other 
court actors would fall back on their habitual way of doing things was 
particularly acute given that the Reform Act neither prohibited the use of 
detention where a defendant lacked adequate funds (both full cash and 10% 
deposition bonds were allowed where necessary to ensure a defendant’s 
appearance in court), nor prevented judges from considering traditional 
factors, like seriousness of the offense, in the release decision.123  Also 
 
goals, which was to ameliorate the worst effects of poverty as criminal defendants prepared 
to contest the accusations against them.”). 
 119 See, e.g., Wood v. United States, 391 F.2d 984, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“We do not 
think that under the Bail Reform Act a determination that money bail is required is 
appropriate unless the court at least ascertains the conduct of defendant when previously 
released on conditions, and whether the defendant previously abided by conditions imposed 
on him in prior proceedings.”); see also GOLDKAMP, supra note 104, at 68 (describing the 
prevalence of “community tie” indicators in state bail schemes after the Bail Reform Act of 
1966). 
 120 Timothy R. Schnacke et al., The History of Bail and Pretrial Release, 2010 PRETRIAL 
JUST. INSTIT. 13 (describing the beginning of the D.C. Bail Agency, the first pretrial services 
agency). https://b.3cdn.net/crjustice/2b990da76de40361b6_rzm6ii4zp.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8GEN-Z5PB]. 
 121 See Friedman, supra note 105, at 309; see also NCJRS Report, supra note 6, at xiv 
(“The Conference presented for analysis and discussion specific and workable alternatives to 
monetary bail based on the experience of the Manhattan Bail Project and some others which 
followed in its wake.”). 
 122 For instance, Illinois’ constitution, as it existed at the time of Beeley’s study and like 
many state constitutions in that era, guaranteed, “All persons shall be bailable by sufficient 
sureties, except for capital offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption great. . . .” 
See Ill. Const. of 1870, art. II, § 7; Leonard Cavise, The New Bail Statute in Illinois: 
Preventive Detention by Any Other Name. . . 10 S. ILL. U. L. J. 631, 644 (1985) (noting that 
Article I, section 9 of the Illinois Constitutions, as it existed in 1985, was “fundamentally 
unchanged from the analogous provisions” in the Illinois Constitutions of 1818, 1848, and 
1870); Hegreness, supra note 29, at 978. Clearly, such constitutional assurances did little to 
ensure the release of many of Cook County’s pretrial detainees. 
 123 Carbone, supra note 29, at 553, 558; see also GOLDKAMP, supra note 104, at 24 
(“While a presumption of release is implicit in the text of the Act, neither a right to pretrial 
release nor a right bail is clearly spelled out. Thus, detention may result even in noncapital 
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significant, the Reform Act applied only to the federal jurisdiction and to 
the District of Columbia—a small sliver of the nation’s pretrial detainees.124  
States remained generally free to design and implement their own system of 
bail administration. 
Consequently, despite the fact that the Reform Act was a release-
oriented statute, financial conditions remained in widespread use to ensure 
detention.125  In the 1969 case United States v. Leathers, the D.C. Court of 
Appeals noted a dramatic increase in bail appeals by persons held on 
unattainable financial convictions, and suggested that the “phenomenon 
may or may not reflect a conscious recoil from the letter and spirit of the 
Bail Reform Act of 1966 on the part of those judges entrusted with its day-
to-day administration.”126  That same year, a federal court in New York 
highlighted the continued use of monetary bonds to obtain preventive 
detention.127  Reviewing bail commissioners’ assignment of financial 
conditions ranging between $100,000 and $300,000 for defendants accused 
of setting off explosives, the court held: “[I]t is apparent that in this 
instance, as in many others familiar to all of us, the statement of the 
 
cases, especially where the traditional money-bail option is selected.”) (emphasis omitted). 
Goldkamp also noted that the Bail Reform Act, with its inclusion of multiple criteria for 
consideration in bail decisions, provided no guidance as to which criteria were more 
important than others, especially in ensuring the appearance of the defendant. Id. at 25, 69. 
This issue continues to create problems in bail decision-making in many states today, where 
criteria for bond decisions are provided no particular weight or order. See, e.g., 725 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 5/110-5 (West 2018) (listing 37 factors to be considered in determining the 
amount of bail and conditions of release under Illinois law); see also ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice: Pretrial Release 104 (2007), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/publications/criminal_justice_standards/pretrial_release.authcheckdam.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/LHT6-LZYN] (noting that Standard 10-5.1(b) which governs release on 
defendant’s own recognizance, “does not specify the weight to be accorded [release criteria], 
either individually or together, and contemplates that they be considered in the overall 
context of other available information, thereby leaving considerable discretion to the judicial 
officer). 
 124 See Danielle Kaeble et al., Correctional Populations in the United States, 2014, 
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/cpus14.pdf [http://perma.cc/RDB8-GKWD] (comparing state and federal correctional 
populations). 
 125 See Friedman, supra note 105, at 282 (noting that while “restricting freedom to 
protect the community has generally not been recognized as legitimate” in bond decisions, in 
practice “through the use of monetary bail requirements set beyond the defendant’s means, 
pretrial detention is imposed far more frequently than necessary to assure appearance”). See 
also SCHNACKE, supra note 60, at 56. 
 126 412 F.2d 169, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (citation omitted). 
 127 United States v. Melville, 306 F. Supp. 124, 125–26 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
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astronomical numbers is not meant to be literally significant. It is mildly 
cynical but wholly undeceptive fiction, meaning to everyone ‘no bail.’”128 
Monetary conditions were used not only to ensure appearance at trial, 
but for less permissible purposes under then-existing bail law.  The 
protection of public safety, which was neither a historical function of bail 
nor a predominant feature of the 1966 Act,129 was implicitly considered in 
state bail decisions throughout the 1960s and 1970s.130  In a political 
pronouncement, the Leathers court acknowledged the ongoing use of such 
implicit detention practices: 
We can appreciate the disquiet a trial judge may feel on occasion in releasing a person 
charged with a dangerous crime because the Bail Act requires it, a feeling we have at 
time[s] shared.  We can also understand the pressures placed on a judge who sincerely 
believes that pretrial release in a particular case is incompatible with the public 
safety . . . .131 
Existing bail guidelines remained vague and voluntary, so that judges 
were allowed to continue exercising significant discretion to achieve 
subjective outcomes.132  In describing local pretrial justice in 1985, 
criminologist John Goldkamp synthesized the problem as one in which 
“judges have conducted bail in a low-visibility, highly improvisational 
fashion with little meaningful guidance concerning how to transact bail to 
realize optimal results.”133 
Goldkamp himself conducted an empirical study of Philadelphia’s bail 
system in 1975, twenty-one years after Professor Foote’s study, and found 
that “in spite of the elaborate efforts of a model bail reform program, bail 
judges continue to ignore community-ties information out of preference for 
the traditional decision-making criteria: criminal charge, prior criminal 
record, and indications that defendants have warrants or detainers 
 
 128 Id. at 127. 
 129 Under the Act, public safety was not a proper consideration in non-capital cases. See 
Leathers, 412 F.2d at 171 (“The structure of the Act and its legislative history make it clear 
that in noncapital cases pretrial detention cannot be premised upon an assessment of danger 
to the public should the accused be released.”). 
 130 See Goldkamp, supra note 72, at 10, 16–17, 17 n.61. 
 131 412 F.2d at 170. Until the passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, discussed infra, 
public safety was not a cognizable basis on which to issue a release decision. 
 132 See Goldkamp, supra note 72, at 8 (Even following the passage of the 1966 Act, 
many states provided little guidance in the bail decision-making process “beyond the gross 
criteria defining a right to bail.” Consequently, in various jurisdictions, bail was left to the 
“sound discretion” of the judiciary or was determined by reference to a schedule listing the 
bail amounts based on criminal charge.). 
 133 Goldkamp, supra note 72, at 55. 
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outstanding.”134  Goldkamp concluded: “Apparently, judicial decision-
making practices are not readily reformed by the mere addition of 
alternative kinds of data to the process.”135  His conclusion mirrored 
Foote’s own about the intractability of judicial decision-making in bond 
court.  The resulting mid-to-late century system was, consequently, one that 
proceeded along disparate paths.  Once again, principles of bail 
administration provided by state and federal law in this period suggest an 
expansive right to pretrial freedom; in reality, judges were employing 
unspoken rationales to ensure the detention of the poor.136 
The first wave of bail reform presaged other challenges in modern day 
bail advocacy, including in those jurisdictions that did adhere to the 
reforms.  Individualization in the release decision was designed to take into 
account such personal factors as a defendant’s neighborhood of residence, 
housing, education, and employment.137  But current research shows that 
consideration of such factors tends to replicate existing societal inequities, 
allowing for the continued over-detention of both the indigent and racial 
minorities.138  Relatedly, 1960s bail reformers limited the scope of their 
projects to defendants considered more “attractive” to judges—those 
accused of nonviolent and minor crimes.  The Manhattan Bail Project, for 
instance, in a nod to political pressure, did not initially include in its sample 
group anyone accused of a narcotics offense, of a sex offense, or of 
assaulting a police officer.139  Thus, societal groups who were disparately 
represented in certain arrest categories, particularly Hispanic and black 
individuals,140 presumably did not receive the benefit of the ROR programs. 
 
 134 GOLDKAMP, supra note 104, at 224. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See Goldkamp, supra note 72, at 10. 
 137 See Foote, supra note 2, at 961 (describing the Manhattan Bail Project’s focus on 
residence patterns, employment and family ties as evidence of reliability in pretrial release 
decisions). 
 138 See Lisa M. Goff, Pricing Justice: The Wasteful Enterprise of America’s Bail System, 
82 BROOK. L. REV. 881, 887 (2017); Mayson, supra note 1, at 496 n.19. Caleb Foote also 
noted this problem in less empirical detail and without explicating the racial implications: 
“Even in a jurisdiction with an extensive project a substantial proportion of urban indigent 
defendants would not meet the standards of reliability which have so far been applied and 
would not obtain a recommendation of release.” Foote, supra note 2, at 962. 
 139 Foote, supra note 2, at 962. 
 140 The historical targeting by law enforcement of black communities and other 
communities of color has been well documented. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW 
JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); PAUL BUTLER, 
LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 43–45 (2009) (providing a brief history of 
the link between race and drug criminalization); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND 
CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 41–55 (1999) (describing the 
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Moreover, even with the introduction of fact-finding in various bond 
schemes, the early predictive release tools were (like Beeley’s) still based 
on misplaced assumptions, including that the seriousness of a person’s 
offense was correlated with a defendant’s likelihood of fleeing.141  In fact, 
the opposite is true.  Those charged with the least serious offenses are the 
most likely to abscond, an empirical fact recognized in the 1970s.142  Due to 
such misbeliefs, the detention net remained wider than necessary. 
In any event, the progress that was attained because of the passage of 
the 1966 Bail Reform Act and related efforts was scaled back as the country 
entered an era defined by tough-on-crime rhetoric and related legislative 
action.  The second wave of bail reform, encapsulated by the Bail Reform 
Act of 1984, implemented a new system of preventive pretrial detention in 
the country. 
 
discriminatory use of stops against black and Hispanic people under “quality-of-life” 
policing models); Law enforcement targeted black neighborhoods, particularly by the use of 
drug raids, beginning in the 1960s. See Mary Beth Lipp, A New Perspective on the War on 
Drugs: Comparing the Consequences of Sentencing Policies in the United States and 
England, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 979, 1007 n. 116 (2004). This trend continued into the 1970s, 
80s and 90s, as racially discriminatory policing, combined with strict drug prosecutions and 
the proliferation of “draconian” drug sentencing laws, catapulted the number of Black 
individuals imprisoned for drug crime; William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 1969 2022–23 (2008). See also id. at 2024 (noting that the “use of drug crime as a 
(partial) proxy for violence amounted to a sentencing enhancement for black drug crime.”); 
see also Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 52 (1994) 
(describing the disparate impact of the war on drugs on black people). 
 141 See Friedman, supra note 105, at 291. Even after the Vera Foundation became less 
cautious in the administration of the Manhattan Bail Project, it still excluded from 
consideration anyone charged with homicide or certain narcotics offenses. There were also 
other concerns with the bond project’s reliance on “residential/family stability measures” 
that may discriminate against certain defendants, without evidence that these measures 
actually increased appearance rates. See also GOLDKAMP, supra note 104, at 91. 
 142 See GOLDKAMP, supra note 104, at 92 (citing, e.g., William M. Landes, Legality and 
Reality: Some Evidence on Criminal Procedure, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 324 (1974) (“[T]he 
main determinants of the defendant’s bond—the severity of the charge (ASC), prior felonies 
(FEL), and parole or probation status (PAR)—are not significant predictors of the 
probability of disappearing. In fact, the more severe the charge, the greater the number of 
prior felonies and the more likely that the defendant is on parole, the lower the estimated 
probability of disappearance, other things constant.”)). See also Arthur R. Angel et al., 
Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 323–24 
(1971); J. LOCKE ET AL., COMPILATION AND USE OF CRIMINAL COURT DATA IN RELATION TO 
PRETRIAL RELEASE OF DEFENDANTS 8–10, 167–70 (National Bureau of Standards Technical 
Note 535, 1970); 
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4. The Second Wave of Bail Reform and the Matter of Public Safety 
Changes to the bail bond system in the second part of the twentieth 
century stemmed largely from prevailing beliefs about the commission of 
violent crime by pretrial defendants.143  Reforms in this era were a reversal 
in letter and spirit from those of the 1960s; they were aimed at the 
protection of society rather than the release of pretrial detainees.144  By 
1984, 34 states and the District of Columbia had laws on their books 
allowing consideration of a defendant’s “dangerousness” in the bond 
decision.145 
Historically, the pretrial release decision had been linked solely to the 
likelihood of appearance at court.146  The passage of the District of 
Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 was the first 
sharp departure from this limitation.  Under the D.C. Court Reform Act, 
judges were allowed to institute widespread preventive detention for “the 
safety of any person or the community.”147  Although financial provisions 
were not to be used to ensure public safety, both risk of flight and public 
safety concerns could justify pretrial incarceration without the imposition of 
money bond.148  In particular, defendants charged with certain “dangerous” 
crimes, crimes of violence, or threatening or intimidating witnesses or 
jurors could be detained without bond,149 as long as judges employed 
specific due process protections in the decision-making process.150  
 
 143 Goldkamp, supra note 72, at 1–2; see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742 (citing S. REP. 
NO. 98-225, at 3 (1983)). Current research undermines the argument that pretrial detention 
increases public safety. Empirical studies show that pretrial detention, and not release, is 
actually associated with higher rates of recidivism. See supra note 16. 
 144 Goldkamp, Danger and Detention, supra note 72, at 1–2. The Bail Reform Act of 
1966 had allowed only the pretrial detention of capital defendants for supposed 
dangerousness. See John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk 
Assessment and the Future of Bail Reform, WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 14 
n. 51), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3041622 [https://
perma.cc/3BKL-7YW8] (describing emerging assessment of danger in the bail decision-
making process by the federal judiciary). As a result, the 1970s and 1980s saw a much 
greater widening of the detention net. 
 145 Koepke & Robinson, supra note 144, at 13. 
 146 BAUGHMAN, supra note 14, at 19 (“Bail historically served the sole purpose of 
returning the defendant to court for trial, not preventing her from committing additional 
crimes.”). 
 147 D.C. ACT, supra note 9; see also SCHNACKE, supra note 60, at 62, 68–72. 
 148 D.C. ACT, supra note 9. 
 149 SCHNACKE, supra note 60, at 72. 
 150 Id. at 73–74 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1322(b)). Due process protections 
included hearings, time limits on detention orders, and a guarantee of a speedy trial. Id. at 
72. 
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However, judges could still use money bond to “unintentionally detain” 
individuals they did not want to release, without signing an explicit 
detention order or affording the required due process protections.151 
In United States v. Edwards, the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the 
constitutionality of the D.C. Court Reform Act, acknowledging that the 
purpose of pretrial detention under the legislation was “to protect the safety 
of the community until it can be determined whether society may properly 
punish the defendant.”152  After conducting a historical analysis of bond, the 
Court rejected the notion that there existed some fundamental right to bail 
(and in doing so rejected Professor Foote’s arguments concerning that 
purported right).153  Instead, it found pretrial detention to be “regulatory 
rather than penal in nature[,]” so that those subject to incarceration were not 
entitled to the full panoply of constitutional rights afforded in the criminal 
process.154 
In 1984, Congress codified the right to detain for both risk of flight 
and public safety reasons.  The Bail Reform Act of 1984, passed as part of 
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, allowed judges four options at the 
bond-setting stage: (1) release the defendant on a personal recognizance or 
unsecured bond; (2) release the defendant on conditions; (3) temporarily 
detain a defendant in certain circumstances; or (4) detain the defendant 
fully prior to trial.155  Congress’s intention was to create an “in-or-out 
system” of pretrial release.156  But it also expanded the categories of 
individuals who could be subject to preventive detention prior to trial.157  In 
 
 151 See Carbone, supra note 29, at 558, 558 n.209; see also SCHNACKE, supra note 60, at 
69 (“By leaving money in the process, however, the 1970 Act did nothing new to avoid 
unintentional detention.”). 
 152 430 A.2d 1321, 1332 (D.C. 1981). The Court found the government had a compelling 
state interest in the pretrial detention of certain defendants, citing among other things an 
“increase in street crime” in D.C. and studies concerning recidivism of people on pretrial 
release. Id. at 1341. 
 153 Id. at 1326 n.9, 1331(“While the history of the development of bail reveals that it is 
an important right, and bail in noncapital cases has traditionally been a federal statutory 
right, neither the historical evidence nor contemporary fundamental values implicit in the 
criminal justice system requires recognition of the right to bail as a ‘basic human right,’ 
which must then be construed to be of constitutional dimensions.”) (citing Foote, supra note 
2, at 969). See also Duker, supra note 30, at 70–71; Carbone, supra note 29, at 520. 
 154 Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1332 (“Although detention pending trial invokes an 
affirmative restraint, historically it has not been regarded as punishment where the purpose 
has been to prevent flight or to prevent the coercion or intimidation of witnesses.”). 
 155 See Bail Reform Act of 1984, supra note 9. 
 156 SCHNACKE, supra note 60, at 75. 
 157 Id. at 77–78; see also Wiseman, supra note 38, at 140 (describing the categories of 
defendants eligible for pretrial detention, including those charged with crimes of violence, 
serious drug crimes, or crimes involving a minor or use of a dangerous weapon). 
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making a pretrial detention decision, courts were to take into consideration 
a broad range of factors, including the weight of the evidence and the 
offense charged (historical bail considerations), as well as the person’s 
character, employment, and family ties (factors stemming from the first 
wave of reform), but also, historically, “the nature and seriousness of the 
danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s 
release.”158  Courts, in the aftermath, have adopted a broad view of what 
constitutes such “danger.”159  The 1984 Act did include a provision that a 
judicial officer could not “impose a financial condition that results in the 
pretrial detention of the person.”160  Thus, any pretrial detention order had 
to be explicit in its intent and signed only after a hearing that provided clear 
procedural guarantees.161  At the federal level, there was theoretically to be 
no more reliance on monetary bond to ensure detention. 
The United States Supreme Court upheld the federal law in United 
States v. Salerno, approving a system of preventive detention for those 
accused of certain crimes.162  In denying a substantive due process 
challenge to the legislation, the Court cited the procedural protections 
afforded to anyone the government sought to incarcerate.163  It found that, 
in light of the government’s “legitimate and compelling” regulatory 
purpose in enacting the Bail Reform Act, which was to “prevent[] crime by 
arrestees,” the law was not facially invalid under the Due Process Clause.164  
In short, Salerno affirmed that there was no categorical prohibition on 
preventive detention under the Constitution.165  The Court likewise found 
no merit to the respondents’ Eighth Amendment claim, dismissing the 
argument that the dicta in Stack v. Boyle provided an absolute right to bail 
 
 158 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4) (2012). 
 159 Wiseman, supra note 38, at 143 (describing legislative history and federal court 
decisions that have given wide scope to interpretations of dangerousness to include the 
likelihood of causing “economic danger”). 
 160 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2). 
 161 Under the Act, the person facing detention is entitled to testify, present and cross-
examine witnesses and to present information by proffer or otherwise. Judicial findings 
approving detention—specifically, “that no condition or combination of conditions will 
reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community”—were to be supported 
by clear and convincing evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2). 
 162 481 U.S. 739 (1987).  
 163 Id. at 742. 
 164 Id.at 749, 752. 
 165 Id. at 746–51. As the Salerno Court stated, the “government’s interest in preventing 
crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling.” Id. at 749. 
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and calling the case “far too slender a reed on which to rest this 
argument.”166 
The magnitude of the Court’s retrenchment and the severity of the 
blow to the progressive movement for bail reform can be measured by 
Justice Marshall’s full-throated dissent, which began with this: 
This case brings before the Court for the first time a statute in which Congress 
declares that a person innocent of any crime may be jailed indefinitely, pending the 
trial of allegations which are legally presumed to be untrue, if the Government shows 
to the satisfaction of a judge that the accused is likely to commit crimes, unrelated to 
the pending charges, at any time in the future.  Such statutes . . . have long been 
thought incompatible with the fundamental human rights protected by our 
Constitution.167 
After the D.C. Court Reform Act and Salerno, states added provisions 
allowing for public safety determinations in bail setting, but often without 
the due process protections included in the Bail Reform Act and relied upon 
by the Supreme Court in affirming the legislation’s constitutionality.168  
Illinois was part of the national trend.  In People ex rel Hemingway v. 
Elrod, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a decision that lay the groundwork 
for judicial sanctioning of preventive detention based on dangerousness.  
Ruling on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought by a defendant 
seeking pretrial release, the Hemingway court held that it was not “adopting 
the principle of preventive detention of one charged with a criminal offense 
for the protection of the public[.]”169  It instead recommended the use of 
pretrial restrictions to protect both the public and the accused’s right to bail, 
and remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of such 
restrictions.170  Yet, the court also stated that it “recognize[d] that many 
crimes are committed by those who are free on bail awaiting trial . . . and 
acknowledge[d] the need to balance the right of an accused to be free on 
 
 166 Id. at 753. In what amounted to a strong undercutting of any subsequent Eighth 
Amendment bail arguments, the Court suggested that for pretrial detention to be “excessive” 
the government would have to fail to provide a sufficiently compelling interest. Id. at 754–
55. The Court, by this point, had already found the prevention of future crime and future 
flight to constitute such interests. See Wiseman, supra note 38, at 152. 
 167 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 168 SCHNACKE, supra note 60, at 85–87; see also Jones, supra note 16, at 934. The 
American Bar Association, too, fell in with the national zeitgeist governing pretrial 
detention, amending its 1979 standards to recognize the “legitimacy of initial preventive 
detention for a certain limited class of defendants when their dangerousness has been proved 
under specific criteria and with appropriate procedural safeguards.” SCHNACKE, supra note 
60, at 132 (citing A.B.A. Standards, Pretrial Release (Explanatory Note), at 7S (Supp. 
1986)). 
 169 People ex rel Hemingway v. Elrod, 322 N.E.2d 837, 841 (Ill. 1975). 
 170 Id. at 81–83. 
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bail against the right of the general public to receive reasonable, protective 
consideration by the courts.”171 
Hemingway was a precursor for things to come in Illinois.172  In 1986, 
voters approved an amendment to the state constitution that allowed a judge 
to deny bail to any person accused of a felony carrying a mandatory prison 
sentence, where the court determined that the release of the accused would 
pose a threat to the physical safety of any person.173  Illinois legislation 
further expanded who could be denied bail for “dangerousness,” beyond 
those categories enumerated under the state constitution.174 
State provisions like those in Illinois uniformly failed to specify what 
constituted a “threat” or “dangerousness” in the bail setting process, 
rendering them unduly vague and providing little notice to defendants about 
possible pretrial consequences.175  Furthermore, the public safety factor was 
used not only in determining the conditions of release, as described in 
Hemingway, but to augment the class of defendants subject to full-scale 
detention prior to trial.176  In contrast to the 1960s reforms that focused on 
individualization, the second wave of bail reform relied heavily on the 
defendant’s charge in determining pretrial eligibility.177 
 
 171 Id. at 81 (citation omitted). 
 172 In People v. Bailey, 657 N.E.2d 953, 967–68 (Ill. 1995), the Illinois Supreme Court 
cited to Hemingway in approving the legislature’s expansion of the categories of defendants 
subject to the denial of bail. 
 173 ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (1986); see also Sally Zeit, Bail Amendment Would Invite 
Abuses, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1986, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-11-03/news/86
03220802_1_amendment-bail-pre-trial [http://perma.cc/6G3Q-RV34]. 
 174 See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.3(a) (West 2014), which allowed the denial of bail for those 
charged with a stalking offense, which was not one of the enumerated categories within the 
amended state Constitution. An Illinois court later upheld such legislation in the face of 
constitutional challenge by affirming there was no “constitutional right to bail,” even for 
someone who was otherwise bailable, and that the denial of bail was within the inherent 
authority of the court to prevent the fulfillment of “threats.”; Bailey, 657 N.E.2d at 967 
(citing Hemingway, 322 N.E.2d at 837). 
 175 See Mayson, supra note 1, at 504–06 (finding that Salerno’s limits on detention had 
“little traction” even in the federal system because the mandated judicial inquiry was 
“amorphous,” in that there was little Supreme Court guidance on to how to determine 
whether a pretrial detention regime was excessive and the standards for showing 
dangerousness were “extremely vague.”); Goldkamp, supra note 72, at 17, 27 (noting that 
one-third of the public safety-oriented laws passed in this time period had no definition for 
danger). 
 176 Goldkamp, supra note 72, at 19. 
 177 Id. at 24–26; see also, McCoy, supra note 118, at 141–42 (“Most observers of justice 
policies would state that the law-and-order movement of the 1970s and 1980s and its 
attendant high fear of victimization prompted judges to hold defendants in custody without 
bail more often, which inevitably eroded the ROR movement.”). 
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There were undeniable racial underpinnings to the new national public 
safety model.178  The beginnings of the policy change were seen in the late 
1960s, when the response to urban protests against racial discrimination, 
particularly in the areas of policing, housing, employment and education,179 
provided a blueprint for using pretrial incarceration to incapacitate vocal 
minorities.  Local authorities reacted to the unrest with full-scale 
crackdowns.  In Detroit, for example, the Wayne County judiciary set 
exorbitant bail for those suspected of participating in the unrest.180  These 
bonds were explicitly intended to ensure the detention of protesters, 
supposedly for the protection of the public.  Wayne County Prosecutor 
William Cahalan announced that his office would request bond amounts of 
at least $10,000 for all persons arrested during the disorder, “so that even 
though they had not been adjudged guilty, we would eliminate the danger 
of returning some of those who had caused the riot to the street during the 
time of stress.”181  Similar acts of protest, occurring in Los Angeles, 
Chicago, and Newark, helped pave the way for the creation of a systemic 
approach to detention based on “dangerousness”—a singular paradigm for 
bail-setting at that time.182  In all the cities in which civil unrest occurred, 
 
 178 See Koepke & Robinson, supra note 144, at 12 (President’s Nixon’s focus on pretrial 
release was attendant to his administration’s wider focus on addressing a purported national 
crime wave, but “[o]f course, the focus of Nixon’s campaign and administration was never 
really on crime per se – race, more than anything, loomed large behind Nixon’s ‘War on 
Crime.’”). 
 179 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 
(“KERNER COMMISSION REPORT”) (1968), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/
8073NCJRS.pdf [http://perma.cc/J246-XTZ6]. 
 180 Comment, The Administration of Justice in the Wake of Detroit Civil Disorder of 
July 1967, 66 U. MICH. L. REV. 1544. 1548–49 (1968) [hereinafter, Civil Disorder] 
(Interviews with 1,014 prisoners who were arrested during the disorder and incarcerated at 
Jackson State Prison disclosed that at least 50 percent of them were being held subject to 
bonds in excess of $10,000 and at least 70 percent on bonds over $5,000). 
 181 Id. at 1549 (citing CYRUS VANCE, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE, FINAL REPORT OF CYRUS R. VANCE, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE CONCERNING THE DETROIT RIOTS 43 (1967), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1
/Digitization/82468NCJRS.pdf [http://perma.cc/9QXR-2RFJ]; see also id. at 1563 (noting 
that such bail assignments, which had little to do with assuring the appearance of the 
accused, are “a prima facie case of an abuse of discretion”). 
 182 Civil Disorder, supra note 180, at 1568; cf. William A. Dobrovir, Preventive 
Detention: The Lesson of Civil Disorders, 15 VILL. L. REV. 313, 315 (1970) (“Because 
preventive detention is not yet part of our law, there are few documented instances of its 
application that can furnish facts that would prove or disprove the need for, utility and 
effectiveness of such a device. It is generally accepted, on the other hand, that judges, in 
setting bail, daily assess the defendant’s ‘dangerousness’ and set bail in amounts designed 
not to be met.”). 
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the normal bail rules were suspended.183  The intention and the result was to 
punish the mostly black residents who were engaging in civil 
disobedience.184 
The change in bail policy was also influenced by the proliferation of 
race-based law enforcement models, including policing principles founded 
on the “Broken Windows” theory.185  That theory provided a metaphorical 
explanation for crime that led to the development of (now-debunked) 
crime-fighting strategies based on aggressive enforcement of minor law 
violations as a way to reduce crime.186  The result was the widespread arrest 
and pretrial detention of low-level offenders, generally in poor 
neighborhoods where residents were overwhelmingly people of color.187  
These policies inevitably undercut the promotion of pretrial release.188 
Instead, pretrial detention was yet another tool to exert social control on 
minorities.189 
 
 183 For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Dobrovir, supra note 182, at 316–20. 
 184 Cf. id. at 320 (“In short, it seems that in the various instances of civil disorder where 
the prosecuting authorities and the courts have adopted a policy of preventive detention to 
‘safeguard’ the community, the policy has been applied wholesale and indiscriminately. It 
has been used to ‘punish’ accused persons before trial.”) 
 185 See George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 1982, https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/ [http://perma.cc/K3S7-PTW4]. 
 186 GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING 
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996). Subsequent research has shown 
very little support of the concept. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken 
Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 271 (2006). 
 187 See supra note 140; see also Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The 
Legacy of Racial Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2271–72 
and n.165 (1998) (arguing that “because of the very subtlety of the racialized arguments 
embedded within the ‘broken windows’ literature, it is much more difficult to challenge the 
racially disparate impacts of the argument’s derivative programs”); Subramanian et al., 
supra note 12, at 9–10 (linking the growth in jail admissions and the length of stay to the rise 
of drug crime enforcement between 1981 to 2006); id. at 15 (noting that the current racial 
disparities in pretrial detention are “caused by myriad and interconnected factors, including 
policing practices that concentrate law enforcement activities in low-income, minority 
communities, combined with the socio-economic disadvantages experienced by residents in 
those neighborhoods”). 
 188 McCoy, supra note 118, at 141–42, 142 n.18. 
 189 See ALEXANDER, supra note 140, at 237 (2010) (“But if mass incarceration is 
understood as a system of social control—specifically, racial control—then the system is a 
fantastic success.”); Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 
122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2184 (2013) (describing social and legal systems that incarcerate black 
people and the poor in disproportionate numbers, including immediately after arrest, thereby 
creating a “crime control system of criminal justice”); Christopher D. Hampson, The New 
American Debtors’ Prisons, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 25–26 (2017) (connecting trends toward 
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5. The Consequences of Considering “Dangerousness” in Bail Setting 
The consequence of the changes in bail law, represented by the 
passage of the 1984 Bail Reform Act and similar state enactments, was both 
a rise in the number of pretrial detainees and an increase in racial disparities 
among those who were locked up.190  The new statutes and constitutional 
provisions gave judges broad range to decide who was and was not 
dangerous, and to impose detention based on those judgments.  As a result, 
explicit racial prejudices and other less overt forms of discrimination could 
infect the pretrial bail-setting process.191 
The growing population of pretrial detainees was also a result of the 
continuing use of money bond.  The nationwide adoption of preventive 
detention mechanisms did not sound the death knell of cash bond; it in fact 
 
detention based on inability to pay debts with historical modes of racial control used over 
black people in pre-Civil War and antebellum America). Cf. Ernst A. Wenk, James O. 
Robison & Gerald W. Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted?, 18 CRIME AND DELINQ. 393, 402 
(1972) (“Confidence in the ability to predict violence serves to legitimate intrusive types of 
social control. Our demonstration of the futility of such prediction should have consequences 
as great for the protection of individual liberty as a demonstration of the utility of violence 
prediction would have for the protection of society.”). 
 190 Wiseman, supra note 38, at 156; see also BAUGHMAN, supra note 14, at 166 (one of 
the “lasting effects” of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was the increased use of pretrial 
detention); Subramanian et al., supra note 12, at 11 (“Despite making up only 13 percent of 
the U.S. population, African Americans account for 36 percent of the jail population.”); 
Minton and Zeng, supra note 16, at 4 (Black detainees represented 35% of the total jail 
population and Hispanic detainees represented 15% of the jail population in midyear 2014); 
Traci Schlesinger, Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Pretrial Criminal Processing, 22 JUST. Q. 
170, 183 (2005) (analyzing data from urban courts compiled by the DOJ and finding that 
racial disparities are “most notable” during the decision to deny bail,” and specifically, black 
defendants are 33% more likely to be denied bail and 21% less likely to be granted non-
financial release than white defendants with similar legal characteristics); Shawn D. 
Bushway and Jonah B. Gelbach, Testing for Racial Discrimination in Bail Setting Using 
Nonparametric Estimation of a Parametric Model (2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990324 [http://perma.cc/M9BK-GJXH] (analyzing State Courts 
Processing Statistics from the BJS to find that black defendants receive statistically 
significant higher bail amounts than whites in multiple offense categories). 
 191 Wiseman, Coercion, supra note 38, at 155–56 (“In addition, of course, the vagueness 
of the personal characteristics factors generally and the dangerousness factor in particular 
allows a tremendous amount of latitude for racial and other types of clearly prohibited 
discrimination; with a laundry list of vague factors to choose from, any reasonably 
competent judge or prosecutor would be able to justify the detention of almost any defendant 
while disguising his real motives—and there is reason to believe the government has taken 
advantage.”); see also Jones, supra note 16, at 930 (noting that this process of bail 
administration, reliant on discretionary determinations, “is at best flawed, and at worst 
produces racial disparities in pretrial detention”). 
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exacerbated its use in ensuing decades.192  There was no explicit judicial 
limit on the use of monetary bond;193 Salerno itself said nothing about the 
use of excessive bonds to effect preventive detention.194  And by the 1980s, 
many states, including Illinois, were using both public safety risk 
assessments and the traditional route of money bail to detain, which further 
widened the detention net.195 
In Illinois, such detention mechanisms were condoned by the 
judiciary.196  Empirical evidence confirmed that money bond was being 
used to preemptively incarcerate.  In 1987, the Illinois Criminal Justice 
Information Authority (“ICJIA”) published a study on the pretrial process 
in Cook County, based on an analysis of 519 court cases terminated in the 
County in 1982 and 1983.197  The ICJIA found that recognizance bonds 
remained rare (issued in only 6% of cases), while 82% of defendants 
received cash deposit or “D-bonds.”198  Approximately 40% of the sample 
population was detained pretrial, and most were in custody for inability to 
pay the D-bond.199  In their subsequent analysis, the study authors explicitly 
encouraged judges to set pretrial bonds in amounts high enough “to achieve 
pretrial detention especially for serious offenders.”200  Such a 
recommendation was consistent with the persistent attitude of many 
criminal justice stakeholders toward the indigent in this period: the poor 
 
 192 BAUGHMAN, supra note 14, at 166; Mayson, supra note 1, at 18 (“Even after the 
1980s reforms, most jurisdictions have “continued to rely on money bail and sub rosa 
detention as a crude mechanism for managing pretrial crime risk.”). 
 193 But see infra Section III (discussing inferred constitutional limits on its use). 
 194 Lauren Kelleher, Out on Bail: What New York Can Learn From D.C. About Solving 
a Money Bail Problem, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 799, 805 (2016). 
 195 SCHNACKE supra note 60, at 85; Mayson, supra note 1, at 18; cf. Kelleher, supra note 
194, at 805 (noting that “bail laws should not authorize judges to consider the public safety 
risk a defendant poses in setting bail, and then fail to bar them from using this public safety 
justification to set bail at an amount a defendant cannot afford (resulting in his pretrial 
incarceration)”). 
 196 See, e.g., People v. Saunders, 461 N.E.2d 1006 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (finding that, 
regardless of the fact that the detainee was likely unable to afford the set bond amount, “the 
financial ability of the defendant is only one of the considerations the court must balance 
when setting bail”). 
 197 CHRISTINE A. DEVITT ET AL., THE PRETRIAL PROCESS IN COOK COUNTY: AN ANALYSIS 
OF BOND DECISIONS MADE IN FELONY CASES DURING 1982–83 (August 1987), https://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppcc-abdmfcd8283.pdf [http://perma.cc/ME8B-FCEM]. 
 198 Id. at 47. 
 199 Id. at 56. Twenty percent of the sample was held for inability to pay between $100 
and $500 (10% of the total bond amount), 18% were unable to post between $600 and 
$1,000, and 26% were unable to pay between $3,000 and $30,000. 
 200 Id. at 73. 
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deserve to be detained.  This is illustrated quite clearly by the ICJIA’s 
callous conclusion that 
it is up to the defendants to determine the ‘costs’ they are willing to pay to secure 
release (for example, some defendants find incarceration so onerous that they even 
are willing to plead guilty in order to be released sooner, while jail conditions may be 
better than the home environment for other defendants, who might actually avoid 
pretrial release).201 
Nationwide, more and more judges detained people for inability to 
pay.  From 1990 to 1994, 41% of all releases were ROR, while 24% of 
releases were based on surety bonds; a decade later, those percentages were 
reversed.202  From 2002 to 2004, surety bonds were imposed in 42% of all 
release cases, while ROR comprised only 23% of all releases.203  Between 
1992 and 2006, the use of cash bail increased 32%, and by 2015, 61% of all 
pretrial releases included financial conditions of release.204  This change 
could also be seen at a local level.  By November 2016, for instance, the 
average monetary bond in Cook County, Illinois was over $70,000, well 
beyond the County’s median household income of $54,648.205 
The results of these second wave policies have been dramatic.  
Currently, 38% of felony defendants nationwide spend the entirety of the 
pretrial period incarcerated, and 90% of that population is jailed solely 
 
 201 Id. at 55 (emphasis omitted). That attitude persists among stakeholders today. 
Defendant Harris County, in moving to dismiss a recent lawsuit challenging the cash bail 
schedule for misdemeanor defendants in the county, see note 216, infra, submitted a brief 
arguing that certain defendants were locked up pretrial because they “wish[e]d to remain in 
custody[.]” See Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 28, ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 
1052 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (No. 4:16-cv-001414). 
 202 THOMAS H. COHEN AND BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 2 (2007), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf [http://perma.cc/FQ5Z-GK2F]. 
 203 Id. See also Mayson, supra note 1, at 18 n.82 (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics 
showing growth in the pretrial jail population from 298,100 in 1996 to 467,500 in midyear 
2014). 
 204 JESSICA EAGLIN AND DANYELLE SOLOMON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., REDUCING 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN JAILS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LOCAL PRACTICE 19 
(2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Racial%20Disparities
%20Report%20062515.pdf [http://perma.cc/P4MJ-QS2F]; see also REAVES, FELONY DEFEN
DANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, supra note 16, at 15. 
 205 See Res. 16-6051, Crim. J. Comm., Bd. of Comm’rs of Cook Cty. (Nov. 17, 2016), 
http://cook-county.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=1676 
[http://perma.cc/K6Z9-FW3P]. See also SHERIFF’S JUSTICE INSTITUTE, CENTRAL BOND 
COURT REPORT (Apr. 2016), https://www.chicagoreader.com/pdf/20161026/Sheriff_s-
Justice-Institute-Central-Bond-Court-Study-070616.pdf [http://perma.cc/66RN-Q8BF] 
(noting an average D-bond of $71,878 and a median D-Bond of $40,000 in a sample of bond 
court observations conducted between February and March 2016). 
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because of an inability to afford money bail.206  These trends were also on 
display in Cook County.207  In 2005, a study conducted by the United States 
Bureau of Justice Assistance confirmed that numerous defendants were 
locked up in the Cook County Jail, not because of flight risk or 
dangerousness, but because they could not afford the monetary bail.208  A 
2011 analysis of the population of the Jail revealed that on any given day, 
there were 2,000 detainees with assigned bail amounts of $6,000 or less that 
they could not pay.209  That same year, a three-judge district court panel 
found that overcrowding was largely the cause of unconstitutional 
conditions in the Cook County Jail—and that pretrial release practices were 
to blame.210 
Moreover, just as the adoption of “dangerousness” as a factor in bail 
administration worked to the detriment of people of color in the pretrial 
system, so too has the continued reliance on money bond.  Studies of bail 
outcomes beginning in the 1980s showed that black defendants received 
 
 206 Subramanian et al., supra note 12, at 32. 
 207 See Eric H. Holder, Jr. et al., Memorandum to Amy J. Campanelli, Cook County 
Public Defender, Re: Cook County’s Wealth-Based Pretrial System 3 (July 12, 2017) 
[hereinafter, Holder Memo], available at http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/11/Holder_Cook-Countys-Wealth-Based-Pretrial-System-2017-07-12.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/7TS7-SJGP] [hereinafter, Holder Memo] (“Despite the [Illinois] Bail 
Statute’s requirement that money bond be a last resort, and that when necessary, it be ‘not 
oppressive’ and set in consideration of the financial resources of the accused, Cook County 
judges set financial conditions for numerous defendants as a matter of course.”). In finding 
that Cook County had “wealth-based pretrial detention practices[,]” id. at 2, the Holder 
Memo cited, among other sources, a 2016 study of Cook County Central Bond Court, which 
concerned a sample of 880 defendants who received money bonds, of which only 25% were 
able to post that bond and secure their release within 31 days. Id. at 6 (citing SHERIFF’S 
JUSTICE INSTITUTE, CENTRAL BOND COURT REPORT 2 (Apr. 2016)). The Holder Memo is 
discussed in more detail in infra Section III(B). 
 208 Id. at 4 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE AND AM. UNIV. SCH. OF PUB. 
AFFAIRS, CRIMINAL COURTS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT, REVIEW OF THE COOK 
COUNTY FELONY CASE PROCESS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE JAIL POPULATION (2005), 
https://auislandora.wrlc.org/islandora/object/auislandora%3A63624/datastream/PDF/view 
[http://perma.cc/G8TU-KAGM]). Data from 2004 showed that almost half of all Cook 
County defendants who received a money bond had to pay $10,000 or more for their release, 
even though 72% of the sampled population was unemployed. Id. at 5. 
 209 David E. Olson & Sema Taheri, Population Dynamics and the Characteristics of 
Inmates in the Cook County Jail, 2012 COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S RE-ENTRY COUNCIL 
RESEARCH BULLETIN 6 https://ecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context
=criminaljustice_facpubs [https://perma.cc/5XUU-VVHT] 
 210 United States v. Cook Cty., 761 F. Supp. 2d 794, 800–801 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“Many of 
the pretrial detainees in the Cook County Jail would, moreover, be bailed on their own 
recognizance, or on bonds small enough to be within their means to pay, were it not for the 
unexplained reluctance of state judges in Cook County to set affordable terms for 
bail . . . .”). 
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worse bail outcomes than similarly situated whites, including by being 
charged higher monetary bonds for release.211  These trends have only 
continued their upward trajectory, in Illinois and nationally.212 
It is these inherently discriminatory outcomes that have motivated the 
most recent wave of bail reforms. 
II. “THIRD WAVE” LEGAL THEORIES IGNITE FRESH DEBATE ABOUT THE 
WISDOM AND LEGALITY OF THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM OF 
PRETRIAL RELEASE. 
For decades following the 1980s changes to bail administration, most 
reform advocates saw only a bleak legal landscape.  With its casual and 
undeveloped yet definitive finding that “preventing danger to the 
community is a legitimate regulatory goal,” 213 Salerno seemed firmly to 
shut the door to any constitutional argument against the use of pretrial 
detention to prevent the commission of future crime.214  The notion that bail 
set above an indigent defendant’s means to pay was “excessive” in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment had long proven to be a non-starter in 
historical and legal terms.215  Reformers might be forgiven for failing to 
envision systemic legal challenges to the pretrial release process in the 
midst of the “second wave” embrace of preventive detention and expanding 
pretrial incarceration. 
 
 211 See Jones, supra note 16, at 939–40 (citing to what Jones calls the “First Generation 
Studies of Race and Bail,” including urban bail studies from the mid-1980s). 
 212 Id. at 941 (citing data from the DOJ’s State Court Processing Statistics Project, which 
found that, in 2003, when controlling for legal and extralegal factors, black defendants were 
sixty-six percent more likely to be in jail pretrial than white defendants, and Latino 
defendants were ninety-one percent more likely to be detained pretrial); Eaglin & Solomon, 
supra note 204, at 12–13 (discussing the overrepresentation of black and Hispanic 
defendants in jails nationwide as a result of discrimination in policing, front end charging 
and sentencing, and probation and parole revocation); Olson, supra note 209, at 4 (Black 
men make up 66.7% of the Cook County Jail population, well over their representative 
population in the County—only one in four County residents are black, see Holder Memo, 
supra note 207, at 25 (citing studies showing that people of color represent 93% of all 
individuals detained for more than two years in the Cook County Jail); Michael Lucci, Cook 
County Black Population Falls by 12,000 From 2015–2016, ILL. POL’Y (June 24, 2017), 
https://www.illinoispolicy.org/cook-county-black-population-falls-by-12000-from-2015-
2016/ [http://perma.cc/GAY8-N7BX]; The authors of this paper, in collaboration with 
statistical experts, analyzed data from the Circuit Court of Cook County covering the years 
2011 to 2013, which revealed that only 15.8% of black defendants charged with Class 4 
felonies were released on bond pretrial, compared to 32.4% of non-black defendants. See 
infra note 325. 
 213 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747. 
 214 Id. at 750–51.  
 215 See supra Section I(B)(2). 
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But change is afoot.  The emerging near-consensus against mass 
incarceration and the criminalization of poverty has fueled widespread 
skepticism of reflexive pretrial detention among legislators and criminal 
justice stakeholders.  It has also renewed the creative energy of legal 
reformers and grassroots organizers. 
A. ESTABLISHED LEGAL PRINCIPLES FOR REFORM: MONEY BOND 
AS A FORM OF WEALTH DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE DUE 
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES 
The money bond system capitalizes on the indigence of the 
overwhelming majority of criminal defendants, confining them based on the 
certain knowledge that they will never be able to afford the price set for 
their pretrial liberty.216  Under that system, the wealthy are able to remain 
free pending trial; the poor, whom are most defendants, stay behind bars.  
This begs a question left undecided in Salerno: is the cash bond system 
fundamentally unfair because it punishes poverty and discriminates against 
the poor?  At this writing, early indications are that there is substantial 
traction for such an argument. 
Two separate lines of authority support the argument that the use of 
money bail orders to detain those who cannot pay violates equal protection 
and due process. 
The first line of cases concerns the well-established entitlement of 
indigent criminal defendants to what has been termed the “basic tools” 
necessary to mount a defense to the charges against them.217  The Sixth 
Amendment, of course, has long been held to require the appointment of 
counsel for an indigent defendant.218  Due process and equal protection also 
require the leveling of the playing field between the indigent and the 
 
 216 This was among the findings in ODonnell v. Harris County, a class action suit 
challenging the practice of setting unaffordable money bonds for indigent defendants 
without a meaningful, individualized determination of whether the bond set was necessary to 
serve an interest of the County. 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (S.D. Tex. 2017). Granting the 
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court determined that Harris 
County has “a custom and practice of using secured money bail to operate as de facto orders 
of detention in misdemeanor cases.” Id. at 1131. 
 217 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (An indigent defendant is entitled to the 
“basic tools of an adequate defense,” which must be provided to him if he cannot afford to 
pay for them) (citation omitted). 
 218 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Sixth Amendment right extends not 
only to felony trials, but to first appeals of right, (Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 
(1963)), and to misdemeanor prosecutions in which the punishment may include 
imprisonment, (Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)). Counsel, whether appointed or 
retained, must perform effectively both at trial, (Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984)), and on appeal, (Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)). 
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wealthy.  In Griffin v. Illinois, the Court held that these principles require 
the provision of a free transcript to an indigent criminal appellant who seeks 
to pursue the first appeal to which state law affords him a right.219  The 
Court’s decision used emphatic, ringing language: “Both equal protection 
and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system—
all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, ‘stand 
on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court.’”220  
Further: “In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of 
poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.”221 
Griffin has been extended and applied on many occasions over the 
latter part of the twentieth century.  In Burns v. Ohio, the Supreme Court 
held that the same principles required the State to furnish an indigent 
criminal appellant with a transcript for use in seeking discretionary review 
by a state supreme court.222  The Court observed, “[t]here is no rational 
basis for assuming that indigents’ motions for leave to appeal will be less 
meritorious than those of other defendants.”223  Rinaldi v. Yeager prohibits 
the State from seeking reimbursement of transcript costs from the 
institutional wages of imprisoned indigent defendants whose appeals are 
unsuccessful.224  In Mayer v. Chicago, the Supreme Court refused to limit 
Griffin to appeals where incarceration was the punishment: “The 
invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal procedures are 
made available only to those who can pay is not erased by any differences 
in the sentences that may be imposed.”225 
Into the 1980s and 1990s, the judiciary continued to rely upon and 
expand Griffin’s principles to undermine wealth-based distinctions in the 
criminal justice system.  In Little v. Streater, the Court ruled that an 
indigent putative father in a paternity suit was entitled to “blood grouping 
tests” at State expense to defend against the allegation of paternity, 226 and 
in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., the Court concluded that an indigent mother whose 
parental rights had been terminated in a trial proceeding could not be barred 
from appealing that determination by virtue of her inability to pay a fee to 
cover the preparation of the record.227  Employing both equal protection and 
 
 219 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
 220 Id. at 17. 
 221 Id. 
 222 360 U.S. 252 (1959). 
 223 Id. at 257–58. 
 224 384 U.S. 305 (1966). 
 225 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971). 
 226 452 U.S. 1 (1981). 
 227 519 U.S. 102 (1996). 
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due process precedents, the Court found that the mother’s interests were 
fundamental and could not be outweighed by the state’s fiscal concerns.228  
Meaningfully for the discussion of bail reform, in Ake v. Oklahoma, which 
required the State to furnish a criminal defendant with a consulting 
psychiatrist to assist in evaluating and formulating an insanity defense, the 
Court explained the principle of Griffin and its progeny in these terms: 
[W]hen a State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal 
proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to 
present his defense.  This elementary principle, grounded in significant part on the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives 
from the belief that justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a 
defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial 
proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.229 
Griffin provides the obvious foundation for a challenge to cash bail.  
For a court to deploy the Griffin line of authority to defeat the use of money 
to incarcerate the indigent (but not the wealthy), prior to trial it would have 
to accept two basic propositions.  The first is set out in the Salerno decision 
itself: not only is there an “important[t] and fundamental” right to liberty 
prior to conviction, but such liberty should be “the norm” in our criminal 
justice system.230  Deprivation of an accused person’s liberty prior to trial 
should be an exception and limited to specific circumstances in which the 
state has a compelling need to confine the defendant.231 
The second basic proposition is that pretrial confinement grievously 
disadvantages the defendant in his criminal case.  It has long been 
recognized that a defendant in pretrial custody is “hampered” in his ability 
to prepare a defense: consulting with counsel becomes difficult and the 
defendant loses the ability to assist in finding witnesses or otherwise 
investigating his case.232  Recent studies have repeatedly shown that 
defendants incarcerated prior to trial are more likely to be convicted and 
more likely to spend time in prison than defendants who were at liberty—in 
part because pretrial custody incentivizes defendants to plead guilty to 
avoid additional time in jail.233  Thus, at least as a normative matter,234 the 
 
 228 Id. at 119–24. 
 229 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985). 
 230 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750, 755. 
 231 Id. at 755. 
 232 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) 
(The “traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a 
defense . . . .”). 
 233 See Heaton et al., supra note 16, at 714; BAUGHMAN, supra note 14, at 161–62; 
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 
2491–93 (2004). In ODonnell v. Harris County, for example, the district court found that, 
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opportunity to be at liberty prior to trial—free of the constraints and the 
coercive pressures of incarceration—is a “basic tool” to which all but a 
narrowly circumscribed minority of defendants are entitled.  To afford this 
opportunity to the wealthy but deny it to the poor is invidious 
discrimination and fundamentally unfair. 
The second line of cases is a trilogy of Supreme Court decisions that 
squarely prohibits confinement of an indigent person who, through no fault 
of his or her own, is unable to pay a fee or a fine.  In Williams v. Illinois, 
the first of these cases, the petitioner was sentenced to the one-year 
maximum for the offense of petty theft.235  In addition, he was fined $500 
and ordered to pay court costs in the amount of $5.236  Because he lacked 
the ability to pay the fine and the fee, he spent an extra 101 days in prison 
beyond the statutory maximum to “work off” those financial obligations at 
the rate of $5 per day.237  The Court viewed the extra confinement as a 
violation of Equal Protection: “once the State has defined the outer limits of 
incarceration necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it 
may not then subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of 
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely by reason of their 
indigency.”238  To do so “works an invidious discrimination.”239 
 
over a recent two year period, 84% of detained misdemeanor defendants pled guilty (many 
of them, likely, to avoid continued detention and secure their freedom), whereas most of the 
misdemeanor defendants who were not detained avoided conviction. 251 F. Supp. 3d at 
1105. In Cook County, Illinois, data from the court clerk’s office pertaining to cases filed in 
the criminal court between 2011 and 2013 reveal that those who remained in custody pretrial 
were half as likely to be found not guilty or to have their charges dismissed as defendants 
who were never in custody. Similarly, persons facing the least serious felony charges who 
were kept in custody were one-fourth as likely to be found not guilty or have their charges 
dismissed as defendants who were never in custody. See Robinson et al. v. Martin et. al., No. 
2016 CH 13587 (data on file with authors); see also Dobbie et al., supra note 26, at 234 
(finding that being released pretrial positively affects a defendant’s “bargaining position” in 
criminal case negotiations, and that released defendants are more likely to be convicted of a 
less charger and fewer total offenses). 
 234 As we explained in Section I, there has been a disconnect between the aspirations and 
assumptions of judicial opinion writing and the realities of quotidian practice in local 
courthouses around the country. The reality—before and after Salerno—has been that a wide 
swath of criminally charged, indigent persons are given bonds with no inquiry or concern as 
to their ability to pay or the appropriateness of their detention. But, of course, it is Salerno’s 
assessment of reality, not the reality itself, which forms the starting point for litigation. 
 235 399 U.S. 235 (1970). 
 236 Id. at 236. 
 237 Id. at 236–37. 
 238 Id. at 241–42. 
 239 Id. at 242. 
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The rationale in Williams was applied the next year in Tate v. Short, in 
which the petitioner was imprisoned for failing immediately to pay the fine 
for a traffic offense.240  Like Williams, Tate was incarcerated at a municipal 
prison farm to work off, at the rate of $5 per day, a fine that he was unable 
to pay.241  The Court had little difficulty concluding that, even though the 
offense in question was not punishable by imprisonment, the incarceration 
of a person unable to pay the fine was discriminatory.242  The Court implied 
that the use of imprisonment was irrational; not only did the imprisonment 
serve no penological purpose, it also served no fiscal one, as the State’s 
revenues were depleted by the cost of housing the indigent person.243 
The last in the trilogy of Supreme Court cases regarding imprisonment 
for non-payment of a monetary penalty is Bearden v. Georgia.244  There, an 
indigent person was sentenced to probation and ordered to pay a fine and 
restitution.245  When he was unable to make the payments, his probation 
was revoked and he was sentenced to prison.246  The Court followed and 
amplified the reasoning of Tate and Williams, concluding that probation 
revocation in these circumstances could not be squared with “fundamental 
fairness.”247  Noting that Tate and Williams had been decided on Equal 
Protection grounds, the Court nonetheless concluded that “the issue cannot 
be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis”—a point on 
which Justice Harlon had insisted in his concurrence in Williams.248 Instead, 
the practice should be seen as violating not only Equal Protection (inflicting 
imprisonment upon the indigent, but not upon those able to pay) but also 
Due Process (by virtue of the simple and fundamental unfairness of 
imprisoning a person for failing to pay a fine that, through no fault of his 
own, he cannot afford).249  The Court’s holding captured both equal 
 
 240 401 U.S. 395 (1971). 
 241 Id. at 395–97 (1971). 
 242 Id. at 397–98 (“Although the instant case involves offenses punishable by fines 
only, petitioner’s imprisonment for nonpayment constitutes precisely the same unconstituti
onal discrimination since, like Williams, petitioner was subjected to imprisonment solely 
because of his indigency.”) (citing Williams, 399 U.S. at 235). 
 243 Id. at 399 (“[T]he defendant cannot pay because he is indigent and his imprisonment, 
rather than aiding collection of the revenue, saddles the State with the cost of feeding and 
housing him for the period of his imprisonment”). 
 244 461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
 245 Id. at 662. 
 246 Id. at 663. 
 247 Id. at 673. 
 248 Id. at 667. 
 249 Id. at 665–67 (“Due process and equal protection principles converge in the Court’s 
analysis in these cases.”). 
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protection and due process concerns: “the State cannot justify incarcerating 
a probationer who has demonstrated sufficient bona fide efforts to repay his 
debt to society, solely by lumping him together with other poor persons and 
thereby classifying him as dangerous.  This would be little more than 
punishing a person for his poverty.”250 
The State, of course, has no penological interest in confining a person 
who has yet to be convicted.  The State’s regulatory interest in protecting 
the community may, in very limited cases, be advanced by explicitly 
requiring the pretrial confinement of a small number of extremely 
dangerous defendants.251  Salerno authorizes a defendant’s detention 
without bail where the defendant should be confined for the protection of 
the community or because he presents too great a risk of flight.252  In 
contrast, money bond (in theory if not in practice) exists in order to 
facilitate the pretrial release of the defendant while providing an incentive 
for him to return to court for proceedings in his case.253  Thus, the setting of 
a monetary bail amount must necessarily reflect the court’s judgment that 
the defendant is an appropriate risk for release with conditions that will, to 
the degree possible, ensure the defendant’s return to court and the safety of 
the community.  What Williams, Tate, and Bearden prohibit is the use of a 
financial hurdle that guarantees the pretrial confinement of those in that 
larger group of charged persons who are fit candidates for release to the 
community but who are indigent and cannot pay the price of freedom. 
Currently, reformers are employing the above-described principles in 
litigation around the United States to attack what one leader of this 
movement calls “human caging” of poor arrestees.254  A first line of attack 
has been against the employment of fixed “bail schedules” for persons 
accused of misdemeanor and other low-level offenses.255  Under this 
 
 250 Id. at 671. 
 251 See infra Conclusion. 
 252 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748–49. 
 253 See NCJRS Report, supra note 6, at xiii (“Originally conceived as a device to free 
accused persons prior to conviction by a court of law, bail ha[s] degenerated into a two-way 
door, opening outward to pretrial liberty for defendants with funds, but inward to prolonged 
confinement for defendants without money to post bond.”). 
 254 The reformer is Alec Karakatsanis, the Executive Director of Civil Rights Corps, and 
the undisputed inspirational and intellectual catalyst of current legal reform efforts. See 
Michael Zuckerman, Criminal Injustice, HARV. MAG. (Sept.–Oct. 2017), https://harvard
magazine.com/2017/09/karakatsanis-criminal-justice-reform. [https://perma.cc/DK7P-EM
CP] See also Civil Rights Corps, Challenging the Money Bail System, http://www.civilrights
corps.org/work/wealth-based-detention (last visited Oct. 1, 2018). 
 255 As a general matter, bail schedules are “procedural schemes that provide judges with 
standardized money bail amounts based upon the offense charged, regardless of the 
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procedure, judges automatically and without exception impose a pre-
determined bail amount (typically less than $500) for all persons accused of 
particular listed offenses.256  Those who can pay the amount gain their 
freedom; the rest remain in jail.  This practice seems impossible to square 
with the Williams/Tate/Bearden line of authority.  Those jurisdictions 
employing a fixed bail schedule for low-level offenses ensure the pretrial 
confinement of the indigent for no purpose.  Nothing supports the 
proposition that a person able to raise a few hundred dollars is more 
deserving of pretrial freedom than a person without those funds.  Faced 
with litigation, several jurisdictions have agreed to consent judgments 
banning the practice, while in other cases, lower courts have issued rulings 
invalidating the use of fixed bail schedules against the indigent.257 
Perhaps the most precedential decision at this writing (at least on the 
issue of bail schedules), is the Fifth Circuit’s anemic opinion in ODonnell v. 
Harris County, which held that Harris County, Texas’ fixed bail schedule 
for misdemeanor arrestees was constitutionally infirm in practice.258  
ODonnell refused to find a state-created due process liberty interest in 
pretrial release, and declined an invitation to categorically bar the use of a 
fixed bail schedule to detain indigent misdemeanor arrestees.259  
Nonetheless, the Court did hold that the mechanical application of the 
schedule to require the confinement of an indigent person while affording 
 
characteristics of an individual defendant.” Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules, 26-SPG CRIM. 
JUST. 12, 14 (2011). 
 256 Id.; see also Heaton et al., 16 note 16, at 730, 733 (noting that use of a schedule 
specifying bail amounts based on the charge and prior convictions “is not uncommon.”). 
 257 See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (S.D. Tex. 2017); Pierce v. 
Velda, Case No. 15cv570, 2015 WL 10013006 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015) (parties entered in 
settlement agreement in which court issued declaratory judgment affirming that holding an 
arrestee in custody because the person is too poor to post a monetary bond violates equal 
protection); Thompson v. Moss Point, Case No. 15cv182, 2015 WL 10322003 (S.D. Miss. 
Nov. 6, 2015) (entering declaratory judgment against City’s use of secured bail schedule as 
applied to the indigent); Cooper v. City of Dothan, No. 15cv425, 2015 WL 10013003 (M.D. 
Ala. June 18, 2015) (granting temporary restraining order and releasing plaintiff on his own 
recognizance or subject to an unsecured bond); see also Buffin v. City and Cty. of San 
Francisco, No. 15cv4959, 2018 WL 424362 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2018) (denying City’s 
motion for summary judgment and concluding that the sheriff’s use of a bail schedule 
implicated the plaintiffs fundamental right to liberty); Walker v. City of Calhoun, Case No. 
15cv00170, 2017 WL 2794064 (N.D. Ga. June 16, 2017) (granting preliminary injunction 
prohibiting City from detaining misdemeanor or ordinance arrestees otherwise eligible for 
release who are unable to afford bond), appeal filed, No. 17-13139 (11th Cir. July 13, 2017). 
 258 882 F.3d 528, 541 (2018). The Fifth Circuit thus vacated the District Court’s 
injunction, which barred Harris County from continuing to use the schedule. See supra note 
233. 
 259 Id. at 544. 
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release to a similar arrestee with means to pay violated equal protection.260  
Case-by-case evaluation, taking into account the arrested person’s ability to 
pay, is a constitutional necessity, the court concluded, but how and whether 
such individualized evaluation could coexist with a fixed bail schedule was 
left unaddressed.261 
Other decisions are less equivocal and herald positive change in 
America’s bail system.  Advocates in California argued in In re Humphrey, 
a habeas corpus case, against the pretrial confinement of an indigent, 
elderly defendant with substance abuse issues who was unable to pay the 
massive bond set in his robbery case.262  The California attorney general 
declined to defend the bond proceedings below,263 and the California Court 
of Appeals responded with a resounding condemnation of local practices, 
where bail is routinely set in an amount impossible for the defendant to 
pay.264  In the court’s view, setting unaffordable bail amounted to nothing 
more than “a sub rosa detention order lacking the due process protections 
constitutionally required.”265  The court was firm: due process requires that 
the presiding judge determine the amount a defendant can pay and then set 
bail within that threshold, unless the state can show by “clear and 
convincing evidence” that a higher amount is necessary to ensure the 
defendant’s future appearances in court.266 
It is, of course, too soon to tell whether the principles in the Humphrey 
opinion will gain nationwide acceptance.  What is clear, though, is that the 
issues will continue to be pressed, and courts around the country will be 
forced to decide the legitimacy of cash-based pretrial procedures. 
B. PRETRIAL DETENTION MAY ONLY BE IMPOSED WITH 
SUFFICIENT PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS 
Third wave reformers have also reinvigorated the legal protections 
mandated by Salerno, using the decision offensively to promote individual 
due process and challenge cash bond.  This is a particularly significant 
 
 260 Id. at 543–44. 
 261 Id. at 546. 
 262 In re Humphrey, 19 Cal. App. 5th 1006, 1017, 1019 (2018), rev. granted, 417 P.3d 
769 (Cal. 2018). 
 263 Id. at 1016. 
 264 Id. at 1014 (“[A]s this case demonstrates, there now exists a significant 
disconnect between the stringent legal protections state and federal appellate courts have 
required for proceedings that may result in a deprivation of liberty and what actually 
happens in bail proceedings in our criminal courts.”). 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. at 1037. 
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trend given that Salerno has traditionally been understood as significantly 
undermining pretrial rights.267 
The Salerno decision was premised on the assumption that the 
assignment of a person to the presumptively small group who should not be 
released would be made following a stringent evidentiary hearing pursuant 
to the 1984 Bail Reform Act.268  Under this legislation, the judge was to 
provide written findings, supported by “clear and convincing evidence,” 
that no conditions of pretrial release could reasonably assure the safety of 
other persons and the community.269  Obviously, the arbitrary imposition of 
an unaffordable bond—without inquiry or explanation—does not comport 
with the Court’s expectation that persons deprived of their pretrial liberty 
receive specific and robust procedural protections. 
Thus, recently, reform advocates have challenged over-detention by 
relying on Salerno’s edict that proper procedures be employed in issuing 
detention orders.270  In Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, for instance, the en 
banc Ninth Circuit considered the legality of an Arizona statute that barred 
bail for illegal immigrants who were found to have committed certain 
serious felony offenses “if the proof is evident or the presumption great” 
that the defendant committed the specified crime.271  The court applied a 
“heightened scrutiny” standard derived from Salerno.272  
Construing Salerno to apply a three-part test, the court concluded that the 
challenged law did not address a “‘particularly acute problem’” (i.e., illegal 
immigrants are not particularly likely to flee or threaten public safety).273  It 
was not limited to “‘a specific category of extremely serious offenses’”;274 
and it failed to afford the individualized determination of flight risk or 
dangerousness mandated by Salerno.275  The Ninth Circuit struck down 
 
 267 See, e.g., Keith Eric Hansen, When Worlds Collide: The Constitutional Politics of 
United States v. Salerno, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 155, 206 (1987) (“The rejection of Salerno’s 
facial claim was in fact a rejection of the categorical depiction of criminal justice rights that 
has long characterized the pro-defense argument.”). 
 268 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–52. 
 269 Id. at 750. 
 270 See, e.g., Corrected Brief of Appellants at 22, Lopez-Valenzuela et al. v. Maricopa 
Cty. et al., No. 11-16487 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2011) (“Proposition 100 [an Arizona statute 
barring bail for illegal immigrants found to have committed certain serious felony offenses] 
grossly violates [the] core principle [of Salerno], by imposing a categorical no-release rule 
without any individualized determination relating to flight risk, resulting in detention even 
when a state court would find that the particular circumstances warrant release.”). 
 271 770 F.3d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 272 Id. at 779–80. 
 273 Id. at 782–83. 
 274 Id. at 784. 
 275 Id. at 784–85. 
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Arizona’s statute, holding that its provisions barring bail for illegal 
immigrants “[were] not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.”276 
Among the striking features of Lopez-Valenzuela is that, in the Ninth 
Circuit opinion, Salerno—long felt to shield pretrial detention practices 
from meaningful review—became a tool to further the rights of pretrial 
detainees.277  The due process analysis that necessitated invalidation of the 
Arizona statute derived from Salerno’s holding that the interest in pretrial 
liberty is “fundamental” and, therefore, cannot be infringed without narrow 
tailoring to serve a compelling state interest.278  Salerno, remarkably, is 
becoming part of the bulwark against reflexive, unexamined pretrial 
detention of disfavored defendants.279 
These early litigation results suggest that there is judicial openness to 
two civil libertarian propositions: (a) that the use of money bond to 
preventively detain the indigent (while allowing freedom to the wealthy) is 
unacceptable; and (b) that the pretrial detention of any individual defendant 
is only legitimate to the extent the state can demonstrate to a high degree of 
probability that detention is necessary to assure the defendant’s future 
appearance or the safety of the community.  It will be up to litigators to 
confirm judicial acceptance of those propositions in future cases.  But, even 
with successful outcomes in court, meaningful reform is far from assured, 
as past experience makes painfully clear. 
 
 276 Id. at 791. 
 277 Id. (“The ‘narrowly focuse[d]’ pretrial release statute upheld in Salerno provided a 
‘careful delineation of the circumstances under which detention will be permitted.’”) 
(quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–51). See also Simpson v. Miller, 387 P.3d 1270 (Ariz. 
2017) (rejecting Lopez-Valenzeula’s application of what the court considered to be a strict 
scrutiny standard to pretrial detention but still striking down an Arizona law categorically 
denying bail to those charged with an offense of sexual conduct with a minor, as the crime 
was “not inherently predictive of future dangerousness” and thus a case-specific inquiry was 
mandated by Salerno). 
 278 Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 791–92. 
 279 This observation applies to the Humphrey opinion as well. Salerno, which, the court 
noted, was essential to the petitioner’s argument, drove the court’s analysis. As the opinion 
explained: “The Bearden line of cases, together with Salerno and Turner, compel the 
conclusion that a court which has not followed the procedures and made the findings 
required for an order of detention must, in setting money bail, consider the defendant’s 
ability to pay and refrain from setting an amount so beyond the defendant’s means as to 
result in detention.” 19 Cal. App. 5th 1006, 1037 (2018), rev. granted, 417 P.3d 769 (Cal 
2018). 
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III. RESULTS ON THE GROUND: WILL THE REARTICULATION OF LIBERTY 
PRINCIPLES TRANSLATE TO GENUINE SYSTEMIC 
TRANSFORMATION? 
We turn in this section to an assessment of the preliminary results of, 
and predictions for, the “third wave” of bail reform.  Commentators have 
suggested that the country has reached a “tipping point” in pretrial 
administration, where money bail will no longer be the ultimate 
determinant of release.280  Instead, release decisions will be based on an 
empirical assessment of an individual defendant’s risk level.281  Recent 
changes in the bond laws of certain states seem to confirm this sea 
change.282 
But this new era of pretrial release is not without its own set of risks 
and challenges.  Judges may simply replace the money bond system with 
one in which release (and detention) decisions are predicated on 
empirically-based risk-assessment models, and the level of pretrial 
detention is affected only marginally, if at all.  Even where rates of pretrial 
detention are curtailed under the new system of risk assessment, 
jurisdictions may make unfounded determinations about who is a viable 
risk—and thus about who is subject to detention without ever having been 
convicted of a crime.283  Similarly, highly-restrictive conditions, including 
GPS tracking and electronic monitoring, may be used more freely in lieu of 
money bond, but with the same restrictive effects on people’s lives.284  Or, 
money bail may remain a determinative part of the pretrial release 
equation.285  We see reason for concern in all such outcomes. 
 
 280 See Gouldin, supra note 1, at 839 (describing the “tipping point” in the reform 
movement, in recognition of the country’s vast system of pretrial incarceration) (citing Lisa 
Foster, Dir. Office for Access to Justice, Remarks at ABA’s 11th Annual Summit on Public 
Defense (Feb. 6, 2016)). 
 281 See Mayson, supra note 1, at 92–93 (stating that there is a movement underway to 
replace the system of monetary bail with one based on risk that the defendant may 
recidivate). 
 282 For instance, New Jersey, as discussed in Section III(A), infra, has led the nation in 
moving away from cash bond. See Megan Thompson & Mori Rothman, New Jersey 
Eliminates Most Cash Bail, Leads Nation in Reforms, PBS (July 22, 2017, 3:26PM), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/new-jersey-eliminates-cash-bail-leads-nation-reforms 
[http://perma.cc/X2TQ-EHP5]; see also Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Bail 
Reform: New Directions for Pretrial Detention and Release, U. PA. FAC. SCHOLARSHIP 1, 15, 
15 n.92 (March 13, 2017). 
 283 Bail scholars Megan Stevenson and Sandra Mayson note that the question of pretrial 
detention is also “a moral one,” as states grapple with when pretrial detention is warranted. 
Stevenson and Mayson, supra note 282, at 16. 
 284 See supra note 23. 
 285 See BAUGHMAN, supra note 14, at 46. 
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A. THIRD WAVE BAIL REFORM EFFORTS AND THEIR 
RAMIFICATIONS FOR PRETRIAL LIBERTY 
To be sure, the current reform movement is producing important 
changes, both in and outside the courtroom.  In 2014, New Jersey passed 
the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), which replaced the traditional 
system of money bail with one centered on defendant risk.286  The passage 
of the CJRA was accompanied by a law enforcement directive disseminated 
by the state’s attorney general, informing prosecutors that they could seek 
the imposition of financial conditions only if “the defendant is reasonably 
believed to have financial assets that will allow him or her to post monetary 
bail in the amount requested by the prosecutor without having to purchase a 
bond from a surety company or to obtain a loan.”287  Colorado altered its 
bail statutes in 2013 to encourage the use of risk-assessment over monetary 
conditions in the bail process.288  New court rules were recently 
implemented in Maryland, New Mexico, and Arizona prohibiting the 
assignment of cash bond beyond what a defendant could pay.289  In Cook 
County, the chief judge of the Circuit Court instituted an administrative 
 
 286 For an overview of the CJRA and the history of its adoption into New Jersey law, see 
Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 707, 714–21 (D. N.J. 2017), aff’d, 895 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 
2018), in which plaintiffs challenged the state law’s constitutionality, discussed infra. 
 287 Memorandum from N.J. Att’y Gen. Christopher S. Porrino to Dir., Div. of Crim. 
Justice et al 55 (May 24, 2017), http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/directives/ag-
directive-2016-6_v2-0.pdf [http://perma.cc/942P-XC5C]. 
 288 H.B. 13-1236, 69th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013); see also Joshua J. Luna, 
Bail Reform in Colorado: A Presumption of Release, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 1067, 1093 (2017) 
(noting that while the new legislation promotes the use of pretrial services programs to avoid 
pretrial detention, it does not go so far as to prevent the imposition of money bond, even for 
low-risk, low-income defendants). 
 289 MD. R. 4-216.1(e)(1)d)(1)(B) (effective July 1, 2017), http://mdcourts.gov/rules/rod
ocs/ro192.pdf [http://perma.cc/2BJ2-4LBX] (“A judicial officer may not impose a financial 
condition in form or amount that the judicial officer knows or has reason to believe the 
defendant is financially incapable of meeting and that will result in the defendant being 
detained solely because of that financial incapability.”); N.M. R. 5-401(E)(1)(c) (effective 
July 1, 2017), http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmrules/NMRules/5-401_6-5-2017.pdf [http://
perma.cc/L8QD-3VX8] (“The court shall not set a secured bond that a defendant cannot 
afford for the purpose of detaining a defendant who is otherwise eligible for pretrial 
release.); ARIZ. R. CRIM. PROC. 7.3(b)(2) (effective April 3, 2017), http://www.azcourts.gov/
Portals/20/2016%20December%20Rules%20Agenda/R_16_0041.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/DWQ2-PCBF] (“The court must not impose a monetary condition that 
results in unnecessary pretrial incarceration solely because the person is unable to pay the 
bond.”). Similarly, Indiana passed a rule that prohibits the assignment of money bond, but 
only where the arrestee does not present a risk of flight or danger to themselves or others. 
IND. CRIM. R. 26 (effective Sept. 7, 2016) http://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/order-rules-20
16-0907-criminal.pdf [http://perma.cc/JFW9-ADQD]. 
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General Order in 2017 that barred the imposition of unaffordable bond.290  
In January 2018, Governor Cuomo of New York announced he would be 
asking the legislature to eliminate cash bail for certain crimes.291  Very 
recently, California passed criminal justice legislation making it the first 
state to abolish cash bail, and instead giving significant discretion to judges 
to detain people, without financial conditions, if they are considered a 
public safety or flight risk.292 
In certain ways, these latest efforts, aimed at the cessation of 
burdensome financial conditions, imitate those of the 1960s.  But the two 
eras are different.  Unlike in Professor Foote’s time, when risk prediction 
was in its infancy, many jurisdictions today are relying on sophisticated 
predictive risk assessments in rendering release decisions.293  The theory of 
these tools is that the defendant’s risk of recidivating and risk of flight can 
be objectively calculated without inserting judicial intuition or subjective 
beliefs into the process.294  It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate 
the validity of the assessments, different models of which have been 
implemented throughout the country.  Needless to say, there has been an 
amassing of scholarship on the topic, including normative and empirical 
critiques of the tools.295 
 
 290 General Order, supra note 21. 
 291 James C. McKinley, Jr., Cuomo, in Bid to Help Poor, Proposes Ending Cash Bail for 
Minor Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/nyregion/
cuomo-ending-cash-bail-state-of-the-state.html [http://perma.cc/L6EW-T342]. The district 
attorneys in Brooklyn and Manhattan thereafter announced that they would not seek cash 
bond on non-felony charges. Jamiles Lartey, New York City to End Cash Bail for Non-
Felony Cases in Win for Reform Advocates, GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.the
guardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/10/new-york-city-to-end-cash-bail-for-non-felony-cases-in-
win-for-reform-advocates [http://perma.cc/4TWE-3SZQ]. 
 292 California Money Bail Reform Act, S.B. 10 (Cal. 2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.
gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB10. [https://perma.cc/7BG4-CQTW]. 
 293 See, e.g., Where Pretrial Improvements are Happening, supra note 19, at 19 (finding 
that currently 30 local jurisdictions rely on the Laura and John Arnold Foundation’s Public 
Safety Assessment-Court (PSA) tool; it is in use statewide in New Jersey); PRETRIAL JUSTICE 
INST., Resource-Based to Risk-Based Pretrial Justice, PREZI (Aug. 7, 2015), https://prezi.
com/h6eboff0oyhx/resource-based-to-risk-based-pretrial-justice [http://perma.cc/R9XK-RM
ZU]; GIDEON’S PROMISE, ET AL., JOINT STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE USE OF PRETRIAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS (May 10, 2017), https://www.nacdl.org/Defenders-May-2017-
RAI-Statement/ [http://perma.cc/Q8PJ-9G7J]. By 2015, about 10% of United States 
jurisdictions were using actuarial risk-assessments instruments to make release decisions, a 
number that is “rapidly growing[.]” Gouldin, supra note 1, at 867. 
 294 See HARVARD LAW SCHOOL PRIMER, supra note 75, at 18. 
 295 These critiques suggest that the pretrial assessments (often called “PSAs”) are far 
from foolproof in their predictive capabilities and run the risk of recreating pervasive 
structural inequities in society writ large. See, e.g., Marie VanNostrand & Gena Keebler, 
Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court 73 FED. PROB. 7 (2009), http://www.us
756 VAN BRUNT & BOWMAN [Vol. 108 
What is pertinent here is how the recent trend toward risk assessment 
may be prompting a renewed fervor for pretrial detention.  The trend has 
been developing for some time. Since the 1980s, many states have 
instituted preventive detention measures based on the charged offense.296  
Currently, twenty-two states in addition to the District of Columbia 
statutorily authorize such findings.297  Recent state efforts are novel, 
however, in that they seek to expand the use of preventive detention by 
relying heavily on empirical assessments that have pervaded the pretrial 
“market,” in order to ascertain defendant “risk.”298  In New Mexico, where 
the state Supreme Court instituted the rule outlawing the use of 
unaffordable money bail, voters in 2016 amended the state Constitution to 
allow judges to hold suspects if they are deemed at high risk of pretrial 
failure.299  Under New Jersey’s CJRA, the judiciary is permitted to 
 
courts.gov/sites/default/files/73_2_1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMH6-CGG2] (advocating the 
use of standardized assessment tools to “reduc[e] the disparity in risk assessment practices 
and provide a foundation for evidence based practices relating to release and detention 
recommendations and the administration of the alternatives to detention program”); Gouldin, 
supra note 1, at 871 (describing the problems of risk assessment tools that merge evaluations 
of risk of flight and risk of recidivism); SCHNACKE, supra note 60, at 106 (describing the 
convolution of risk of flight and dangerousness and PSAs’ failure to define protective factors 
mitigating risk); Mayson, supra note 1, at 557 (analyzing what level of actuarial risk should 
justify pretrial detention in the era of empirical risk assessments); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-
Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 
(2014) (raising constitutional and normative arguments against the use of risk prediction 
assessments based on demographic and socioeconomic factors); Julia Angwin et al., 
Machine Bias, PRO PUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-
bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [http://perma.cc/7DCK-KTDK]; Jeff Larsen et 
al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, PRO PUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm 
[http://perma.cc/5877-BDFP] (empirically assessing racial differences in a specific risk 
assessment algorithm); Heaton et al., supra note 16, at 772 (2017) (asserting that risk-based 
assessment will not eliminate racial and socioeconomic inequalities as they “import the 
effects of race and class disparities earlier in the system”). 
 296 Gouldin, supra note 1, at 879–81. 
 297 See HARVARD LAW SCHOOL PRIMER, supra note 75, at 25, 25 n210 (listing state 
statutory schemes). 
 298 New Jersey, Washington D.C., and New Mexico are the only jurisdictions that allow 
for preventive detention based on pretrial risk, in addition to charge. See Where Pretrial 
Improvements are Happening, supra note 19, at 12. But in the recent environment, more 
states are likely to implement preventive detention based on risk assessment. See HARVARD 
LAW SCHOOL PRIMER, supra note 75, at 25. 
 299 N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13, (amended 2016), http://www.sos.state.nm.us/nmconst2017
.pdf [http://perma.cc/E9V6-P8EL]. Judges may use risk assessment tools to determine 
whether a defendant may be released. See ACLU OF NEW MEXICO, Beyond the Myths: 
Making Sense of the Public Debate About Crime in New Mexico 3 (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.aclu-
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preventively detain certain defendants after a hearing on a defendant’s 
likelihood to appear and his risk to public safety.300  California’s new bill 
allows the wholescale pretrial incarceration of anyone a judge deems “high 
risk.”301  The result is that a significant pretrial population in these 
jurisdictions may never have the opportunity to obtain release pending 
trial.302 
Strikingly, unlike the push for “public safety” detention in the 1980s, 
which was spurred in large part by crime control advocates, this new wave 
of reform has sometimes been propelled by advocacy groups and policy 
organizations committed to removing financial conditions from the pretrial 
release decision.303  This position can create strange alliances, as suggested 
by the 2017 case of Holland v. Rosen, in which a federal district court in 
New Jersey addressed the constitutionality of the CJRA on a preliminary 
injunction motion.304  In a twist, the plaintiff in Holland sought recognition 




 300 N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:162-15 (2014). See also Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 
707, 716–21 (D.N.J. 2017). A full review of New Jersey’s recent changes to pretrial 
procedures, including the amendment to the state’s constitution that permitted detention and 
paved the way for the passage of the CJRA, can be found in State v. Robinson, 160 A.3d 1, 
5–6 (N.J. 2017). 
 301 Id.; see also Meagan Flynn, California Abolishes Money Bail with a Landmark Law. 
But Some Reformers Think it Creates New Problems, WASH. POST. (Aug. 29, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/08/29/california-abolishes-
money-bail-with-a-landmark-law-but-some-reformers-think-it-creates-new-
problems/?utm_term=.7464e008c1fa [https://perma.cc/L8NZ-TTGM] (Bail reformer Alec 
Karakatsanis noted that the new law “replaces detention based on poverty with detention 
based on algorithm.”). 
 302 In D.C., for instance, which allows for risk-based pretrial detention, 12% to 15% of 
all charged defendants are held preventively. See Spurgeon Kennedy, PRETRIAL SERVICES 
AGENCY FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Freedom and Money – Bail in America, 
https://www.psa.gov/?q=node/97 [http://perma.cc/Q3CP-7KXB]; see also Beau Beaudin, 
PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCY FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, The D.C. Pretrial Services 
Agency: Lessons from Five Decades of Innovation and Growth 2 (2009), https://www.psa.
gov/sites/default/files/PJI-DCPSACaseStudy.pdf [http://perma.cc/FD3S-WKAZ]. 
 303 See Mayson, supra note 1, at 4, 6 (“A generation ago, pretrial restraint to prevent 
non-case-related future crime . . . was a matter of intense controversy. Today’s bail reform 
movement, by contrast, has assumed the legitimacy of pretrial preventive restraint and 
advocates preventive detention as a basic component of a model pretrial system. Advocacy 
groups like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) have sporadically voiced concerns 
but have nonetheless signed on to the reform agenda.”). 
 304 Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 707, 713 (D.N.J. 2017), aff’d, 895 F.3d 272 (3d 
Cir. 2018). 
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on electronic monitoring, which he found unduly burdensome.305  Holland 
also challenged the CJRA’s insertion of safety considerations into the 
pretrial release determination, which allowed for the assignment of “severe” 
pretrial restrictions on those out on bail.306  Holland’s suit was brought in 
conjunction with a bail bond insurer who attempted to veil its blatant 
financial interest in a constitutional claim for monetary bail.307 
On the other side, advocacy organizations, including the ACLU of 
New Jersey and the NAACP, filed an amicus brief in support of the State, 
citing to Salerno and arguing for the validity of the CJRA partly on the 
grounds that public safety considerations were well-established factors in 
the pretrial release decision.308  Prior to the filing of the Holland case, these 
organizations had engaged in dogged efforts in support of the eradication of 
a pretrial system based on money bail, including through the public 
promotion of the CJRA.309  In accordance with the amici position, the 
Holland court ultimately denied the preliminary injunction, and finding 
there was no implied right to monetary bail under the U.S. Constitution and 
 
 305 Id. at 723, 726, 739–46. 
 306 Id. at 741–42 (“Plaintiffs argue that ‘nothing in Salerno provides any support for the 
CJRA’s sweeping provisions authorizing severe liberty restrictions of non-dangerous defen
dants—i.e., anyone charged with a covered crime whose risk of flight can be negated 
through house arrest and an ankle monitor.’”). 
 307 Id. at 723, 727–29. 
 308 See Brief of Proposed Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, 
Drug Policy Alliance, Latino Action Network, and NAACP at 20–24, Holland, 277 F. Supp. 
3d at 707 (“Salerno remains good law and, despite Plaintiffs’ suggestion to the contrary, 
does not merely stand for the proposition that some people may be detained without bail. It 
also makes clear that the government may legitimately consider public safety in the 
regulation of pretrial release.”) (citation omitted). 
 309 See id. at 7–9 (Statement of Interest of Amici). See also, e.g., Bail System Reform, 
ACLU OF NEW JERSEY, https://www.aclu-nj.org/legislation/bail-system-reform1 [http:/
/perma.cc/KW6Z-ZGSM]; Alexander Shalom, ACLU-NJ: N.J. Bail Praised But Mass 
Incarceration Persists, N.J.COM (Dec. 5, 2017), http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2017
/12/aclu-nj_the_problem_with_njs_a_grade_on_bail_refor.html [http://perma.cc/9PQL-XZ6
P] (ACLU of New Jersey’s senior staff attorney discussing his work on the nonpartisan 
committee that proposed recent bail reforms); David Matthau, If you Can Afford to Pay, 
Should You Be Let Out of Jail? NJ Court Will Decide, NEWJERSEY101.5 (Aug. 21, 2017), 
http://nj1015.com/if-you-can-afford-to-pay-should-you-be-let-out-of-jail-nj-court-will-dec
ide/ [http://perma.cc/6GTL-29BG] (interviewing Alexander Shalom, voicing support for 
CJRA); Groups File Friend-of-the-Court Brief in Lawsuit by Insurance-Backed Bail 
Industry to Overturn Landmark Reforms, ACLU (July 28, 2017), https://www.aclu
.org/news/aclu-nj-other-civil-rights-groups-push-back-against-bail-industry-challenge-
pretrial-justice [http://perma.cc/T4UE-KFZL]; Alexander Shalom, ACLU: Why N.J.’s New 
Pretrial Justice System is Fairer and Smarter, N.J.COM (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.nj.com/
opinion/index.ssf/2017/04/aclu_why_njs_new_pretrial_justice_system_is_fairer.html [http:/
/perma.cc/49MD-3C2D]. 
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affirming the government’s prerogative to implement restrictive pretrial 
measures.310 
The Holland case exemplifies the dynamics of this new era of bail 
reform, where advocates may accede to, or even promote, the government’s 
right to enforce risk-based incarceration in exchange for the elimination of 
cash bail.  Given the egregious and well-documented consequences of 
financial detention,311 there is obvious merit to this position.  There are 
risks involved as well.  With their tactical compromise, reformers risk 
rubber-stamping an expansion of the system of preventive detention.  In 
1970, Laurence Tribe decried a federal scheme of pretrial detention aimed 
at minimizing recidivism as a slippery slope: 
Once the government has instituted a system of imprisonment openly calculated to 
prevent crimes committed by persons awaiting trial, the system will appear to be 
malfunctioning only when it releases persons who prove to be worse risks than 
anticipated . . . But when the system detains persons who could safely have been 
released, its errors will be invisible.312 
Harkening to Tribe’s warning, any enlargement of the pretrial carceral 
state now will be difficult to reverse in the future. Its success will be 
assumed by virtue of its existence.  This is of particular concern for a 
system of bond administration based on empirical risk assessment, since the 
system’s primacy will be bolstered by the data on which it ostensibly relies.  
The lack of an alternative reality in which there are measurable positive 
outcomes stemming from more widespread pretrial release will serve as a 
roadblock to successful legal challenge and reform. 
The third wave reform position also risks trading away the right to 
release on recognizance for release subject to other conditions that, while 
not involving money, are nonetheless restrictive and damaging.313  Most 
 
 310 277 F. Supp. 3d. at 741–43. 
 311 See, e.g., supra notes 233 and 244. 
 312 Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John 
Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 375 (1970). Tribe further stated: “The pretrial misconduct of 
these persons will seem to validate, and will indeed augment, the fear and insecurity that the 
system is calculated to appease.” Id. 
 313 The burden inflicted by pretrial release “services,” including drug testing and 24-hour 
electronic monitoring and GPS tracking, have been well-documented. See, e.g., Robin 
Steinberg & David Feige, The Problem with NYC’s Bail Reform, THE MARSHALL PROJECT 
(July 9, 2015, 4:16 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/07/09/the-problem-with-
nyc-s-bail-reform [http://perma.cc/3EC6-BKR7] (“In the pretrial services model, released 
defendants are steered to an agency that can impose conditions on their freedom. Failure to 
maintain compliance with mandated services can lead to violations of supervised release, 
reincarceration, and other penalties. The problem with the pretrial-services model is that 
these ‘services,’ which are a condition of one’s release, are often identical to, and sometimes 
far more onerous than the sentence one would receive for actually being guilty of the 
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bail statutes already contain numerous alternatives to pretrial detention, 
many of which are quite onerous.314  Again, the Holland suit is 
illustrative.315  Mr. Holland was faced with a prosecutor’s petition to 
preventively detain him prior to trial, pursuant to the CJRA.316  In order to 
avoid being held in jail, Mr. Holland agreed to electronic monitoring, a 
form of state control that intruded significantly on his privacy rights and his 
liberty.317  The state effectively forced Mr. Holland into a “pretrial plea 
bargain”—an exchange of one type of custody for another.318  This is the 
very type of coercion that the recent changes to money bail were intended 
to eradicate.319  Thus, the focus in Holland on the money bail issue distorted 
 
crime.”); McCoy, supra note 118, at 144 (“In the name of humane reform of bail practices 
and therapeutic help for addicts, the Philadelphia courts have designed a system in which an 
entire class of offenders is subjected to intrusive state control while on release and while 
they have not been convicted of anything.”) (emphasis in original); Punishment is Not a 
“Service”: The Injustice of Pretrial Conditions in Cook County, CHICAGO COMMUNITY 
BOND FUND (Oct. 24, 2017), https://chicagobond.org/docs/pretrialreport.pdf [http://perma
.cc/YCH3-EFR2] [hereinafter, Bond Fund Report] (“Under the guise of helping accused 
people come back to court and avoid re-arrest, pretrial conditions restrict the liberty of 
innocent people and even mimic the same harms as pretrial incarceration, causing loss of 
jobs, housing, access to medical care and putting severe strain on social support networks 
and family members.”); see also Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation 
and the Meaning of Recidivism, 104 GEO. L. J. 291, 349–50 (2016) (“The critique of 
Progressive-inspired rehabilitation programs, however, was that they did make poor people 
vulnerable by granting the state huge amounts of discretionary power over their lives.”); 
Wiseman, Right to Be Monitored, supra note 23, at 1375 (arguing for a constitutional right 
to pretrial monitoring, in lieu of financial conditions of release, despite acknowledging that a 
system of pretrial represents a “serious intrusion” into a defendant’s privacy). Such intrusive 
state action imposed on those who have not yet been convicted of any crime tend to raise 
serious constitutional concerns as well. See United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 868 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (“[O]ne who has been released on pretrial bail does not lose his or her Fourth 
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizures . . . .”) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Cruz v. Kauai County, 279 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 314 Gouldin, supra note 1, at 853–54. Gouldin notes that “[t]ypical nonfinancial 
conditions include requiring a defendant to: remain in the custody of a third party; seek or 
maintain employment or education; refrain from associating with particular people; abide by 
restrictions on travel and housing; comply with curfews or restrictions on living 
arrangements; refrain from excessive alcohol use; avoid all drug use; not possess weapons; 
report regularly to supervising authorities; and undergo medical, psychiatric and/or 
substance abuse treatment.” Judges are also generally allowed to craft their own conditions 
on top of any prescribed alternatives. Id. at 854. 
 315 277 F. Supp. 3d 707 (2017). 
 316 Id. at 722, 742. 
 317 Id. at 742–43. 
 318 Id. at 742 (“Holland waived his claims to have money bail be considered as one 
possible condition for his pretrial release when he agreed to accept . . . monitoring in 
exchange for the prosecution dropping its request for detention.”). 
 319 See supra note 234, on the coercive aspects of money-based pretrial detention. 
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consideration of an equally pressing right—namely, the right of pretrial 
defendants to be released on the least-restrictive conditions necessary.320  It 
is particularly important to pay heed to this concern given that the efficacy 
of many pretrial conditions, and in particular electronic monitoring, in 
preventing recidivism, are at best uncertain.321 
B. CASE STUDY: CAMPAIGN TO ELIMINATE THE USE OF CASH 
BOND IN COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 
Cook County, where reform efforts have been underway for some time 
at this writing, provides a useful case study of third wave reform efforts.  
Illinois, both historically and in the present, has been preoccupied with bail 
reform.  Advocates, criminal justice stakeholders, and judicial officers have 
widely criticized Cook County’s bail practices for years.322  Stakeholders 
and opinion leaders have decried the exorbitant financial costs,323 and the 
 
 320 Holland, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 717 (citing to the CJRA’s requirement that pretrial 
release include “the least restrictive condition, or combination of conditions” that the court 
determines necessary). 
 321 See Gouldin, supra note 1, at 854–55. See also Lisa Pilnik, A Framework for Pretrial 
Justice: Essential Elements of an Effective Pretrial System and Agency, NAT’L INST. OF 
CORRECTIONS 45 (Feb. 2017), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/Download
DocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=c8bd044e-0215-9ab6-c22e-b1a4de912044. [https://
perma.cc/Q5M6-2AQY]. 
 322 See BEELEY, supra note 65; see also, e.g., Sharon Grace, Introducing Principles of 
Bail reform in Cook County (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/introducing-
principles-for-bail-reform-in-cook-county/ [http://perma.cc/6ZNC-FHMS]; Pub. Hearing 
Notice & Agenda, Crim. Just. Comm., Bd. of Comm’rs of Cook Cty., at 3 (Nov. 17, 2016), 
http://cook-county.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=1676 [http://perma.c
c/R5EF-5Q3E]; Mitch Dudek, Experts, Attorneys Keep Up Push to Abolish Cash-for-Bond 
System, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016), https://chicago.suntimes.com/chicago-politics/
increasing-momentum-to-abolish-cash-for-bond-system/ [http://perma.cc/YTT8-6DYV]. In 
a 2016 speech, Illinois Supreme Court Justice Anne Burke stated, “Judges—apparently 
distrustful of the information provided to them by pretrial services—refuse to allow eligible 
individuals to be released on their own recognizance and, instead, continue to require large 
cash bonds, even for relatively minor, nonviolent crimes. But even low bonds are too large if 
you are poor.” Frank Main, Cook County Judges Not Following Bail Recommendations: 
Study, CHI. SUN TIMES (July 3, 2016), https://chicago.suntimes.com/chicago-politics/cook-
county-judges-not-following-bail-recommendations-study-find/ [http://perma.cc/HZB6-FU3
X]. 
 323 On February 1, 2017, 95% of Cook County’s jail population was detained pretrial. 
The average cost of a jail stay is $143 per day, and the average length of stay was 57 days, 
for a total cost of $8,151. See Hilary Gowins, Cook County Judge Unveils Change to Cash 
Bail, ILL. POL’Y (July 18, 2017), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/cook-county-judge-unveils-
change-to-cash-bail/ [http://perma.cc/ED6L-GEYU]; Lili Holzer-Glier, Inside the Massive 
Jail that Doubles As Chicago’s Largest Mental Health Facility, VERA (2016), 
https://www.vera.org/the-human-toll-of-jail/inside-the-massive-jail-that-doubles-as-
chicagos-largest-mental-health-facility [http://perma.cc/GC2U-MFEJ] (“taking into account 
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human toll on families and the accused324 of the monetary bond system that 
was, until recently, employed pervasively in the County’s Central Bond 
Court.325 
We filed the class action lawsuit Robinson v. Martin in October 2016 
in Illinois state court.326   Grounded in the principles of equal protection and 
due process outlined in Section III, the suit challenged the extensive and 
racially-discriminatory use of pretrial detention in Cook County.327  The 
suit claimed that de facto bail policies disproportionately and negatively 
impacted black defendants in the County.328  Robinson sought to force the 
County to ameliorate these conditions. 
Although the case was dismissed on procedural grounds without a 
decision on the merits,329 as often happens, the litigation further propelled 
the efforts of grassroots organizers and advocates, who are also seeking an 
end to the County’s system of wealth-based detention.  In 2016, community 
groups working on issues of mass incarceration and racial justice—
including Chicago Appleseed Fund for Justice, the Sargent Shriver National 
Center on Poverty Law, the People’s Lobby, A Just Harvest, and many 
others—joined to form the umbrella organization, the Coalition to End 
 
the treatment, medication, and security required to incarcerate a mentally ill person, the daily 
cost doubles and even triples.”). 
 324 See, Saneta deVuono-powell et al., Who Pays? The True Cost of Incarceration on 
Families, Ella Baker Center for Human Rights 8–9 (2015); see also supra note 58. 
 325 See Holder Memo, supra note 207, at 2–7 (describing the prevalence of cash bond in 
Cook County through 2016). 
 326 No. 2016 CH 13587 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2016). 
 327 See Robinson, No. 2016 CH 13587 at n.3. The suit was brought on behalf of two men 
who were arrested on theft charges and held for months in jail because they could not afford 
to post bonds of $1,000 and $5,000. 
 328 Data collected from the Circuit Court of Cook County, supra note 212, revealed that 
of those defendants against whom Class 4 felony charges were instituted from 2011 to 2013, 
only 15.8% of the black defendants were released on bond. Conversely, 43.9% of the black 
Class 4 defendants remained in custody throughout the pretrial period, while only 29.8% of 
non-black Class 4 felony defendants remained in pretrial custody. The bond versus custody 
outcomes for those charged with other classes of felonies is likewise stark in this period. See 
Robinson, No. 2016 CH 13587 at para. 36 and 37. 
 329 See Order Granting Section 2-619.1 Motion to Dismiss, Robinson, No. 2016 CH 
13587 (filed on June 26, 2017). The Plaintiffs have since chosen to pursue a challenge to the 
Cook County pretrial procedures in another forum, rather than seek appeal at the state 
appellate level. As described in the text, the filing and litigation of the suit precipitated 
significant reforms to Cook County’s pretrial system as well as political action on the issue, 
see infra Section III(B). 
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Money Bond.330  The Coalition has undertaken lobbying and organizing 
efforts to end the overuse of pretrial detention in the County.331  Their 
efforts have been supplemented by those of the Chicago Community Bond 
Fund, a founding member of the Coalition, and an organization dedicated to 
harm reduction for those in the jail complex by raising funds to pay bail 
amounts for those who cannot afford them.332 
This advocacy has produced results in the political arena. On June 9, 
2017, then-Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner signed new legislation, the Bail 
Reform Act of 2017, intended to address the persistence of cash bail in 
pretrial decision-making.333  The Act did not place hard limits on the use of 
monetary bail, but it did recommend that any pretrial conditions imposed be 
non-monetary in nature.334  Its passage was a sign of the growing 
mainstream acceptance of non-cash alternatives in bail setting.  In July 
2017, the Cook County Public Defender released a memorandum prepared 
by former Attorney General Eric Holder criticizing the court system’s 
reliance on financial conditions and its consequent over-detention of the 
poor.335  The memo called for “sorely needed” reforms in Cook County, 
where “pretrial detention outcomes have long been detached from valid 
criminal justice concerns.”336 
That same month, Circuit Court of Cook County Chief Judge Timothy 
Evans announced his intention to issue General Order 18.8A, which 
prohibits judges within the County from setting cash bail in amounts 
 
 330 See The Coalition to End Money Bond, About the Coalition, CHICAGO APPLESEED 
http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/coalition-to-end-money-bond/ [http://perma.cc/84GX-9M
SN]. 
 331 Id. 
 332 See CHICAGO COMMUNITY BOND FUND, https://www.chicagobond.org 
[http://perma.cc/9JZS-PX4W]. 
 333 The Bail Reform Act of 2017, S.B. 2034, 100th Gen. Assembly (Ill. 2017), 
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=&SessionId=91&GA=100&DocTyp
eId=SB&DocNum=2034&GAID=14&LegID=105495&SpecSess=&Session= 
[http://perma.cc/GY84-LV4J] (signed into law on June 9, 2017). Members of the Coalition 
to End Money Bond had a significant role in shaping and improving the Bail Reform Act 
signed by the Governor. See Coalition to End Money Bond, Monitoring Cook County’s 
Central Bond Court: A Community Courtwatching Initiative 4 (Feb. 27, 2018), 
http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Courtwatching-
Report_Coalition-to-End-Money-Bond_FINAL_2-25-18.pdf [http://perma.cc/F2RE-47BU] 
[hereinafter, Courtwatching Report]. 
 334 The Bail Reform Act of 2017 supra note 333. For more information on the Act and 
its implications, see Sharlyn Grace, Illinois Takes Small First Step Toward Bail Reform, 
CHICAGO APPLESEED (June 9, 2017), http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/illinois-takes-small-
first-step-toward-bail-reform/ [http://perma.cc/WY46-BYT8]. 
 335 Holder Memo, supra note 207. 
 336 Id. at 2, 32. 
764 VAN BRUNT & BOWMAN [Vol. 108 
beyond what defendants could afford.337  This judicial directive was an 
anomaly in reform efforts; it was promulgated pursuant to the chief judge’s 
administrative authority, rather than as legislation or a court rule.338  
Following the Order’s implementation on September 18, 2017, no person 
who was arrested on a felony charge in Cook County, and who was 
otherwise bailable by statute, was to be incarcerated prior to trial because of 
inadequate funds to pay for release.339  The Order was to be read in 
conjunction with the statutes that govern bail in the state.340 
In its first year, the Order appears to have produced a dramatic 
reduction of those incarcerated in the Cook County Jail for inability to post 
bond.  The population of the Jail, which is the country’s second largest 
single site jail correctional facility and houses the vast majority of the 
County’s pretrial population,341 declined by more than 1,100 inmates in the 
 
 337 See GENERAL ORDER, supra note 21;  
see also Press Release, Office of the Chief Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County, Evans 
Names Judges to Serve in Pretrial Division (Sept. 15, 2017), http://www.cookcounty
court.org/MEDIA/ViewPressRelease/tabid/338/ArticleId/2573/Evans-names-judges-to-
serve-in-Pretrial-Division.aspx [http://perma.cc/S62X-SNUX]. The Order contains a 
presumption “that any conditions of release imposed shall be non-monetary in nature” and 
that the court ‘shall impose the least restrictive conditions or combination of conditions 
necessary to reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant for further court proceedings. 
GENERAL ORDER, supra note 21 at ¶ 6. 
 338 Compare Supreme Court of Illinois, 
2015 Annual Report of the Illinois Courts, Administrative Summary, at 4, 31, 
http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/SupremeCourt/AnnualReport/2015/2015_Admin_Summary.p
df [http://perma.cc/6B9U-LPHE] with supra Section III(A) (discussing other state reforms). 
See notes 291–293 for a discussion of other states’ reform initiatives in bond release 
decision-making. 
 339 Megan Crepeau, Bond Court Gets Underway in Cook County with Different Judges, 
New Guidelines, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 18, 2017, 5:45 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com
/news/local/breaking/ct-met-cook-county-cash-bond-20170918-story.html [http://perma.cc/3
S5T-RHSS]. GENERAL ORDER, supra note 21, ¶ 7 (“When the Court determines that 
monetary bail is a necessary condition of release, the court shall, in substance, make the 
following findings . . . b. the amount of bail is not oppressive, is considerate of the financial 
ability of the defendant, and the defendant has the present ability to pay the amount 
necessary to secure his or her release on bail[.]).” The Order took effect for all 
misdemeanors on January 1, 2018. Id. at ¶ 1. 
 340 See GENERAL ORDER, supra note 21, Comments. In that vein, the Order affirmed who 
is entitled to bail and who may be detained without release during pretrial proceedings. See 
725 ILCS 5/110-4, delineating “bailable offenses” in Illinois. Those who commit certain 
serious felonies may be detained without bail where “the proof is evident or the presumption 
great that the defendant has committed [the] offense” and where the State has demonstrated 
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant poses an immediate threat to the safety 
of other persons and that no conditions of release would effectively protect the public. 725 
ILCS 5/110-6.1. 
 341 Olson, supra note 209, at 1. 
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first two months after the Order took effect.342  In one week in December 
2017, the Jail held 5,900 detainees—the lowest level at the facility in 
decades and a decrease of 1,500 detainees since just September 2017.343  
The Office of the Chief Judge also released statistics near the end of 2017 
showing that 60% of the 3,500 defendants processed through the criminal 
court system since the Order’s implementation received individual 
recognizance bonds (I-bonds) and thus were released without any financial 
conditions.344  Moreover, according to a study conducted by the Cook 
County Sheriff’s Justice Institute, the median bond amount in the County 
fell to $8,500 in the first two months the Order was in effect—a sharp 
decline from the $75,000 median bond amount recorded one year prior.345 
Despite these positive developments, however, a deeper look at the 
quotidian operation of the County’s bond hearings leaves room for concern. 
In furtherance of litigation in the Robinson suit, we obtained transcripts of 
the weekday felony bond hearings held in the first month after the Order’s 
implementation from September 19, 2017 to October 17, 2017, a total of 
2,118 pretrial release hearings.346  We assessed an additional 684 release 
 
 342 See Amanda Vinicky, Cook County Jail Population Down 15 Percent After Bond 
Reforms, CHICAGO TONIGHT, WTTW (Nov. 20, 2017, 6:45 PM), https://news.wttw.com/
2017/11/20/cook-county-jail-population-down-15-percent-after-bond-reforms 
[https://perma.cc/GNZ9-SK7H]; see also The Civic Federation, The Impact of Cook County 
Bond Court on the Jail Population: A Call for Increased Public Data and Analysis 3 (Nov. 
15, 2017) [hereinafter, Civic Federation Report]. The population decline was reported by the 
Cook County Sheriff’s Office, which is responsible for operating the Jail. The Cook County 
Circuit Court is not expected to review any statistical effects of the Order until after its first 
year of implementation. See Press Release, Office of the Chief Judge, Circuit Court of Cook 
County, Evans Changes Cash-Bail Process for More Pretrial Release (July 17, 2017), 
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/MEDIA/ViewPressRelease/tabid/338/ArticleId/2561/Evans
-changes-cash-bail-process-for-more-pretrial-release.aspx [http://perma.cc/6ZRZ-RLWV]. 
 343 Andy Grimm, Bond Court Reforms Lead Record-Low Inmate Count in Cook County, 
CHI. SUN-TIMES (Dec. 22, 2017, 9:27 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/chicago-
politics/bond-court-reforms-lead-to-record-low-inmate-count-in-cook-county/ 
[http://perma.cc/GA73-JSDF]. 
 344 Id. 
 345 Id.; see also Ward Room, Bond Court Reforms Lead to Record-Low Inmate Count in 
Cook County Jail, NBC5 News (Dec. 23, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.nbcchicago.
com/news/local/bond-court-reforms-record-low-inmate-count-cook-county-jail-
466134743.html [http://perma.cc/N6EX-4G64]. 
 346 Plaintiffs’ counsel conducted a review of the bond court hearings following the 
implementation of the General Order, in order to challenge a motion to dismiss filed by the 
Judicial Defendants (the results are on file with the authors.). In particular, the Defendants 
argued that the imposition of General Order 18.8A rendered the Robinson lawsuit “moot,” 
because there was no longer a case or controversy stemming from the detention of 
individuals based on the failure to pay a set bond amount. Plaintiffs argued otherwise, citing 
preliminary analysis of the bond court review. Plaintiffs asserted that that the Defendants 
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hearings in two weeks in January 2018.  The results were, to some extent, 
sobering. 
In the fall of 2017, bond court judges set an unaffordable condition of 
release in 15% of cases.347  That statistic was higher for certain judges than 
others.348  One judge assigned unaffordable monetary conditions of release 
in approximately 17% of his cases; another did so in almost a quarter of his 
cases.  The judge who assigned the most unaffordable bonds in the sample 
would regularly state on the record that such bonds were “not oppressive” 
or “excessive” and considered “the defendant’s ability to pay.”  This litany, 
repetitive and unvarying, seemed to be an attempt to stave off future 
challenges to his pretrial release decisions.  But the vast majority of the 
defendants who came before that judge were still in custody in the weeks 
after the bond hearing—a clear sign that the bond amount was not, in fact, 
“considerate of the financial ability of the accused.”349 
By January 2018, circumstances had improved.350  Most judges 
followed the Order, setting unaffordable cash bonds rarely, if ever.  Yet, 
certain judges continued to flout the Order’s authority.  In 204 of the 684 
sampled hearings, defendants were not asked what they could afford to pay 
to obtain release, and the defendant’s attorney did not offer that 
information.  One judge in particular set a bond amount above what the 
arrestee could pay in 52 hearings.  The highest assigned bond amount above 
what someone said they could pay was approximately $10,000.  The 
minority of judges who consistently ignored the Order’s mandate and 
assigned unaffordable financial conditions seemed to evince a belief (well-
 
failed to show “voluntary cessation” of the unlawful conduct sufficient to moot the case, 
since “Cook County Judges overseeing bond court have regularly disregarded Judge Evans’ 
admonition against setting oppressive cash bonds.” See Plaintiffs’ Suppl. Br. in Opp. to 
Defs.’ Supp. 2-619 Mot. to Dismiss for Mootness at 1, Robinson v. Martin, No. 2016 CH 
13587 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2016). 
 347 This statistic was determined by evaluating the number of times each judge set a bail 
amount above what the defendant, through his attorney, stated he could pay on the record. 
The data from this admittedly small sample is on file with the authors. 
 348 The lack of consistency between bond court judges is another enduring problem in 
Cook County’s bond court administration. See Injustice Watch Staff, Jail Roulette: Cook 
County’s Arbitrary Bond Court System 3, INJUSTICE WATCH (Nov. 29, 2016), 
https://injusticewatch.org/interactives/jail-roulette/ [http://perma.cc/E22X-65TS] (The bond 
system in Cook County is “a strikingly arbitrary system under which defendants’ fates—
whether they are released or held in jail—depend on which judge they happen to draw and 
what the judge’s mood happens to be at the time.”). 
 349 725 ILCS 5/110-5(b). 
 350 Plaintiffs’ counsel again conducted a review of bond court hearings in that month, 
analyzing 684 hearings in a two-week period for compliance with the General Order. Those 
results are also on file with the authors. 
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founded or not) as to the defendant’s high level of risk.  In such 
circumstances, money bond was still being used implicitly to ensure 
preventive detention. 
These findings, though limited in scope and empirical precision, are in 
line with a court-watching report released in February 2018 by the 
Coalition to End Money Bond.351  In September and October 2017, while 
there was a vast increase in the number of defendants who are asked about 
their ability to pay a monetary bond, court observers found that judges 
continued to assign money bonds in 23% of all cases.352  Moreover, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that the Order is being entirely disregarded in 
County courtrooms beyond Central Bond Court, including in the felony 
preliminary hearing courtrooms, where motions to reconsider unaffordable 
bond amounts are heard.353  And as of December 15, 2017, there were 3,289 
people in the jail incarcerated pretrial because they could not afford a 
money bond.354 
 
 351 Members of the Coalition to End Money Bail tracked outcomes for felony defendants 
in bond hearings in the weeks following the implementation of the General Order and 
similarly found that judges overseeing bond hearings set bond amounts above what people 
could pay, even over the objections of defense counsel. See Chicago Community Bond 
Fund, Advocates Say Illinois Bond Court Judges Continue to Fail at Implementation of 
Reform [hereinafter, Community Bond Fund Observations], ENEWS PARK FOREST (Oct. 3, 
2017), https://www.enewspf.com/latest-news/latest-local-news/advocates-say-illinois-bond-
court-judges-continue-fail-implementation-reform/ [https://perma.cc/B62F-C826]; see also 
Civic Federation Report, supra note 342, at 24. Chief Judge Evans reported that judges may 
be setting overly high bond amounts in cases where they believed the defendants could 
afford more than they claimed. Id. at 35 (citing Statement by Timothy C. Evans, Cook Cty. 
Bd. Comm’rs Fin. Comm. Mtg. (Oct. 27, 2017)). However, the large number of pretrial 
detainees in the jail, discussed supra, belie this assertion. Moreover, there has been no action 
taken by the court system to address the thousands of pretrial detainees who attended bond 
hearings prior to the September 2017 implementation of the Order and who remain 
imprisoned for failure to pay. See Community Bond Fund Observations, supra note 349; see 
also Kevin Gosztola, Interview with Max Suchan of Chicago Community Bond Fund on 
Failure of Judges to Implement Bail reforms, SHADOWPROOF (Oct. 22, 2017), 
https://shadowproof.com/2017/10/22/interview-max-suchan-bond-court-reforms-chicago/ 
[http://perma.cc/5D8V-8NGV] (noting that of the 180 cases in which defendants were given 
monetary bonds and that The Coalition to End Money Bond tracked in the weeks following 
the Order’s implementation, only half were able to pay the set amount within seven days). 
 352 See Courtwatching Report, supra note 333, at 28. Of those who were asked what 
they could afford, only 46% were given affordable bond amounts. Id. at 32. 
 353 Detainees may seek modification of their bail orders at any point in the criminal 
proceedings. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6(a) (2018). 
 354 Courtwatching Report, supra note 333, at 29. 
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The Circuit Court of Cook County’s own data on the General Order’s 
implementation confirms that judges persist in disregarding its mandate.355  
In the first three months of 2018, 25.6% of defendants appearing in bond 
court still received a D-bond, or cash bond, and of that contingent, only 
54.1% of defendants were actually able to post the bond.356  Between 
November 2017 and June 2018, more than 1,350 people were still being 
held in the Cook County Jail, unable to afford the judge-assigned bond.357  
Further, these numbers underreport the extent to which pretrial arrestees in 
Cook County remains incarcerated pretrial.  While 16.3% of arrestees 
received an electronic monitoring order, allowing them to be released into 
the community, only 35% were ever actually placed on monitoring –
meaning the other 65% of defendants stayed in custody.358  The chief judge, 
at this time, has taken no measures to address the failure of certain judges to 
follow the Order or the continued incarceration of those unable to purchase 
freedom. 
The initial results from Cook County have several implications for 
future reform efforts more broadly.  The first is that an unenforceable 
administrative order or other procedural directive that lacks the force of law 
will not be sufficient to change ingrained patterns of state court judges.359  
Systemic reform in Illinois will require the adoption of a judicial order or 
the passage of a state supreme court rule that plainly proscribes the use of 
 
 355 See Circuit Court of Cook County Model Bond Court Dashboard: January – March 
2018, COURT STATISTICS AND REPORTS, http://www.cookcountycourt.org/Portals/0/Portal
/MBC%20Dashboard %20CY18%20Q1.pdf [http://perma.cc/5D7C-54R5]. 
 356 Id. at 2. 
 357 COALITION TO END MONEY BOND, SHIFTING SANDS: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
FIRST YEAR OF BOND REFORM IN COOK COUNTY 6 (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.chicagobond.org/reports/ShiftingSands.pdf. [https://perma.cc/36GE-8BFD]. 
 358 Id.; Model Bond Court Dashboard, Circuit Court of Cook County (January – March 
2018) (on file with author). 
 359 In Robinson, the Defendants moved to dismiss the suit partly on grounds of 
mootness, citing the General Order. Plaintiffs responded in opposition, citing both the failure 
of certain judges to set affordable bonds and the lack of legal authority for the General 
Order. See Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants Supplemental 2-619 Motion to 
Dismiss for Mootness, Robinson v. Martin, No. 2016 CH 13587 (filed Aug. 14, 2017). 
Though laudable, there is evidence that the General Order exceeds Judge Evans’ 
administrative authority, provided under Article VI of the Illinois Constitution and Illinois 
Supreme Court Rule 21(c). Those provisions do not permit him to impose substantive 
obligations on Cook County judges concerning how to hold bail proceedings. Id. 
Consequently, the defendants remain free to ignore the order and continue incarcerating the 
poor. This, it seems, is exactly what has happened. 
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money to detain.360  Half measures, however well-intentioned, will not 
suffice. 
The second implication is that even in a jurisdiction like Cook County, 
where reform appears to be warmly embraced by the vast majority of the 
stakeholders, there is a significant risk of “backsliding” that must be 
guarded against.  This requires constant vigilance—by advocates willing to 
publicly expose officials who fail to abide by pretrial standards,361 by 
defense attorneys, who must work daily to enforce the rights of their 
detained clients via motion practice and appeals, and by civil rights 
attorneys willing to bring suit against municipal actors.362  It also requires 
the implementation of regular trainings for Pretrial Division employees and 
judges in the administration of non-monetary bail.  Finally, and of 
particular importance in Cook County where there is a lack of transparency 
as to the operation of criminal justice systems,363 reform mandates public 
dissemination of data concerning pretrial division operations. 
The state of reform in Cook County remains in flux.  The authors 
continue to press forward with legal bond reform efforts and organizers 
continue to advocate for decreased pretrial detention.  While the initial 
venture away from a cash-bail system has not been an unparalleled success, 
there is no doubt that the reform movement is well underway and still 
gaining momentum.  But it is also true that effecting lasting change to the 
 
 360 Reformers, with the support of former AG Eric Holder, have called for the passage of 
such a Supreme Court rule in Illinois. See Sharlyn Grace, Advocates Urge Illinois Supreme 
Court to Issue Rule Change to Stop Jailing People Due to Poverty, CHICAGO APPLESEED 
(Nov. 14, 2017), http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/more-than-70-organizations-individuals-
call-for-supreme-court-rule-on-bail/ [http://perma.cc/AN54-YZYC]. 
 361 Advocates in Cook County regularly rely on the media to promote transparency in 
bail reform efforts. See, e.g., Alan Mills & Alexa Van Brunt, Dart’s Misguided Approach to 
Jail Reform, CHI. TRIB. (Mar 12, 2018, 5:25 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news
/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-dart-misguided-jail-reform-toni-preckwinkle-0313-
story.html [http://perma.cc/7JMJ-N4JH]; David Baltmanis & Alexandra Black, Letter: Is 
Cook County’s Bail Reform Working?, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 2, 2018, 1:52 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/letters/ct-cook-county-bond-jail-dart-
20180302-story.html [https://perma.cc/8TQA-29ZQ]; Rev. Dwayne Grant, Letter: How 
Cook County’s Sheriff is Failing His Community, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 19, 2018, 3:01 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/letters/ct-tom-dart-cook-county-sheriff-bond-
reform-20180319-story.html [http://perma.cc/F8P3-HGDT]. 
 362 Conditions of release, including monetary bail, may be modified or eliminated on a 
defendant’s petition. See supra note 350. A defendant may also appeal a bond order to the 
state Appellate Court, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(c)(1). 
 363 See generally Civic Federation Report, supra note 342, at 44 (decrying the lack of 
data transparency in the Circuit Courts of Cook County and recommending that the Chief 
Judge “develop and publicly release data reports . . . [including] anonymous breakdowns of 
bond orders by judge”). 
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County criminal justice system remains, as ever, a moving target.  The 
County has seen an uptick in the number of people held on “no bond” 
orders since the General Order went into effect.364  This trend toward 
outright detention, should it continue, suggests that advocates and attorneys 
will have to deploy new tactics geared toward deincarceration.365 
Finally, while the observations detailed here are of course specific to 
Cook County, they raise greater questions about the trajectory of bail 
reform writ large, as cities across the country adopt measures intended to 
end the ignominious pay-for-release money bond system.366  The recent 
decisions of certain Cook County judges harken back to the previous waves 
of bail reform, in which attempts to eradicate the use of money in the 
pretrial process failed, ultimately due to the obduracy of the judiciary.  
Moving forward, attention must be paid to how reform efforts can serve as 
a counterweight to such tendencies. 
CONCLUSION: OBSERVATIONS IN SUPPORT OF A JUST SYSTEM OF PRETRIAL 
ADMINISTRATION 
The presumption of innocence is obvious in theory, but 
counterintuitive in practice.  The rule of law insists that the facts not be 
prejudged and due process respected.  Those who are merely accused, 
convicted of no crime, are entitled to the fair process that can only occur 
when the state is held strictly to its burden of proof and acquittal is assured 
if the state’s proof falls short.  Experience breeds the cynical view that, 
since many arrestees may be guilty in fact, it is expedient to presume the 
guilt of all.  In a sense, the history of bail reform is the story of the war 
between these opposing visions. 
 
 364 See SHIFTING SANDS, supra note 357, at 7. Between November 2017 and June 2018, 
522 people were denied the possibility of release on a “no bond order.” Id. This represents a 
fourfold increase (from 2% to 8%) in the number of people held preventatively since the 
General Order went into effect. Id. 
 365 This trend has certainly been observed in other jurisdictions experimenting with bail 
reform. In 2017, Maryland adopted a court rule, 4-216.1, which promotes the release of 
defendants on their own recognizance or on an unsecured money bond. MD. RULE 4-
216.1(b). Analysis of pretrial administration in the state since the rule’s adoption reveals that 
while the use of cash bail and bail amounts have decreased dramatically, the number of 
defendants being held without bail has increased. See Christine Blumauer et al., Advancing 
Bail Reform in Maryland: Progress and Possibilities, PRINCETON UNIV. SCHOOL OF PUBLIC 
AND INT’L AFFAIRS, Feb. 27, 2018, at 22, http://wws.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/
Advancing_Bail_Reform_In_Maryland_2018-Feb27_Digital.pdf [http://perma.cc/NZT3-
PHBH]. 
 366 See generally Where Pretrial Improvements are Happening, supra note 19 
(describing reforms to pretrial practice through legislative, judicial, and executive branches 
of various states). 
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The tug of expedience, abetted by the public’s insistence on 
community safety, has proven extremely powerful over the centuries.  
“Third wave” reformers must understand that their efforts to transform 
pretrial detention practices will continue to face powerful forces of inertia 
and resistance.  We believe, though, that history indeed “rewards our 
research.”367  It offers useful guidance as to a path toward meaningful 
reform of the pretrial detention apparatus with a lasting and substantial 
reduction in cruel and unnecessary detention of legally innocent people. 
The current attacks on monetary bond as unconstitutional wealth 
discrimination have moral and legal traction.  We hope and expect to see 
additional judicial rulings that strike down reliance on wealth as the arbiter 
of who remains in custody facing trial.  This important and necessary 
litigation strategy is, however, insufficient standing alone.  Advocates must 
anticipate and resist the systemic inertia that, without vigilance and 
vigorous advocacy, will produce hollow victories in which wealth-based 
detention is merely exchanged for a system of pretrial detention of the same 
indigent defendants—now because they are explicitly deemed too 
dangerous, too controversial, too unattractive, or too risky to release. 
We offer several observations, based on the review of history and our 
own personal experience advocating for change on the ground.  First, 
reformers should never fear too much justice.368  The detention of any 
legally innocent person prior to his criminal trial should be an exceptional 
event.  That event should only occur when, after a hearing and proof by an 
exacting standard, it is determined that detention is essential to ensure the 
proper functioning of the criminal process or to protect members of the 
public from specific, articulable threats to their safety.  Salerno may have 
authorized preventive, pretrial detention, but it should not be read as 
enabling such detention as a matter of routine practice.  As evidence, 
Salerno deemed pretrial liberty—not detention—to be the “norm” in our 
system.369  It assumed that preventive detention would only occur where the 
state satisfied its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that 
nothing short of detention could reasonably assure the safety of the 
community.370  Reformers must not lose sight of the bottom line: we seek a 
 
 367 See supra note 28. 
 368 Justice William Brennan famously criticized the majority in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279 (1987) for its “fear of too much justice” in rejecting the race-based challenge to the 
death penalty. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 369 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to 
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”). 
 370 Id.; U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B). 
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system in which pretrial liberty actually is the norm and the number of 
persons detained is dwarfed by the vast majority who are granted liberty. 
Some risk to public safety is necessarily associated with this model.  
But the assumption of that risk is essential if practice is to conform to 
constitutional principles of due process, equal protection, and the 
presumption of innocence.371  As Justice Jackson opined in his concurrence 
in Stack v. Boyle: “Admission to bail always involves a risk that the accused 
will take flight. That is a calculated risk which the law takes as the price of 
our system of justice.”372  Reformers should not shrink from demanding 
that stakeholders accept the necessity of minimal risk to public safety, 
which is inevitable if we are to fundamentally transform pretrial detention 
practices. 
Second, the rules requiring the elimination of cash bond and placing 
strict limits on preventive detention must be mandatory and enforceable.  If 
history has taught us anything, it is that the pull of custom, political 
calculation, and even bias will override systems of change that depend upon 
or give wide range to judicial discretion.373  Where judges can employ 
discretion to detain, there is every reason to fear that they will do so. 
Stakeholders who are truly committed to changing conditions of 
pretrial administration should commit to the negotiation of rules or statutes 
that cannot be easily subverted by the judicial officers presiding over bond 
hearings.  Rules must be clear and unambiguous, both in prohibiting the 
imposition of money bonds that defendants cannot afford and in barring the 
detention of any person without the most exacting demonstration that the 
detention is imperative to the proper functioning of the system or the safety 
of the community. 
Third, whatever the terms of the applicable statutes or court rules, 
ensuring long-lasting reform will require constant vigilance by all 
concerned advocates and parties.  History and experience teach that the 
case-by-case fight in the trenches to effectuate the rights of individual 
defendants will be an essential piece of the reform efforts.  Where statutes 
require, for example, that the defendant not be detained without clear and 
convincing proof, criminal defense counsel must insist on the requisite 
 
 371 Stack, 342 U.S. at 8 (1951) (Jackson, J. concurring); see also Schnacke, supra note 4, 
at 8 (“[T]he fears associated with even the smallest amount of pretrial failure cause those 
leaders to focus first and almost entirely on mitigating perceived risk, which in turn leads to 
unnecessary pretrial detention. But these fears misapprehend the entire concept of bail, 
which requires us first to embrace the risk created by releasing defendants . . . and then to 
seek to mitigate it only to reasonable levels.”). 
 372 Stack, 342 U.S. at 8 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 373 See, e.g., supra notes 132 and 191. 
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proof.  They must also appeal cases in which the requirements are 
disregarded by prosecutors and judges.  Otherwise, statutes and rules that 
sound progressive on paper will be reduced to dead letter.  Reformers must 
engage with the criminal defense bar, while defense counsel must carry the 
banner of reform in every individual case. 
Fourth, reformers should engage with pretrial services agencies and 
work within the system to transform those agencies, so the focus is less on 
ascertaining risk and more on ensuring the success of those who are in the 
community pending trial.  Certain pretrial services could easily and 
inexpensively be directed to assist those released on recognizance in 
returning to court—for instance, through the implementation of text or 
phone call reminders of court dates, travel vouchers, courthouse childcare, 
job assistance, and drug treatment.374  These interventions have already 
proved successful in various jurisdictions in bolstering return rates.375  In 
this same vein, risk prediction instruments may be utilized to determine 
 
 374 See supra note 371; see also Nissa Rhee, Has Bail Reform in America Finally 
Reached a Tipping Point?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Apr. 3, 2017), 
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2017/0403/Has-bail-reform-in-America-finally-
reached-a-tipping-point [http://perma.cc/RQ3C-4VT8] (describing the effectiveness of mail 
and phone call reminders about court dates); Bond Fund Report, supra note 313, at 3 
(recommending bus passes, child care and work-friendly court hearings and citing to 
successful such initiatives in Manhattan); Jocelyn Simpson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. 
REV. 585, 603-04 (2017) (citing to local bail funds that provide social services, like drug 
treatment, counseling, and job referrals, to those on pretrial release); Esmond Harmsworth, 
Bail and Detention: An Assessment and Critique of the Federal and Massachusetts Systems, 
22 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 213, 223 (1996) (noting that the most 
“important supervisory technique may be the provision of bilingual information.”); see also 
Brian H. Bornstein et al., Reducing Courts’ Failure-to-Appear Rate by Written Reminders, 
19 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, & LAW 70 (2013); HARVARD LAW SCHOOL PRIMER, supra note 75, at 
16 (reviewing high rates of effectiveness in court reminder programs). In the probation 
context, scholars have noted that “some standard conditions operate differently on poor 
defendants,” as poor defendants often have difficulty meeting fixed appointments because of 
work obligations and childcare responsibilities and due to a lack of reliable transportation. 
Doherty, supra note 313, at 350. 
 375 See Bornstein et al., supra note 374, at 76; Daniel Bernal, Taking the Court to the 
People: Real-World Solutions for Nonappearance, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 547, 562–70 (2017) 
(describing the success of Arizona initiatives, including reminders of court dates and 
expanding court hours, in reducing failure-to-appear rates); HARVARD LAW SCHOOL PRIMER, 
supra note 75, at 16 (describing significant reduction in failure to appear rates in three 
jurisdictions that employed reminder systems); Marie VanNostrand et. al, State of the 
Science of Pretrial Release Recommendations and Supervision, PRETRIAL JUST. INSTIT., 16–
20, [https://perma.cc/QFK5-8UGG] (reviewing reminder studies in six jurisdictions and 
finding that each study “concluded that court date notifications in some form are effective at 
reducing failures to appear in court”). 
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individual defendants’ particular needs while on release.376  A human rights 
approach to pretrial reform posits that job training, rather than monitoring, 
and substance abuse counseling, rather than house arrest, are the means of 
ensuring compliance with court conditions and, more importantly, 
preventing recidivism after the termination of the criminal proceedings.377  
In any event, pretrial conditions should not be used to punish, and they 
certainly should not be used subjectively by judges who are trading one 
form of custody (i.e. jail) for another (i.e. state monitoring). 
The decision whether to release a defendant prior to trial is, in the 
great majority of cases, the most consequential ruling that will occur in the 
case—in terms of its effect on the defendant’s life, on his or her family, on 
his or her future prospects, and on the particular case in which the 
defendant stands charged.  At this moment in history, there is widespread 
revulsion toward the unnecessary cruelty of a system that depends far too 
heavily on incarceration.  We should not squander the moment by 
demanding less than what justice requires. 
 
 
 376 See Starr, supra note 295, at 871 (“Compared to the use of risk prediction in 
determining whether or not to detain an arrestee, it is easier to defend the use of risk 
prediction instruments in the assignment of prisoners, probationers, and parolees to 
correctional . . . programming (e.g., job training) and in the shaping of conditions of 
supervised release (e.g., drug tests).”). 
 377 See Melissa Aubin, The District of Oregon Reentry Court: An Evidence-Based 
Model, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 39, 42 (2009) (discussing evidence-based programming in the 
federal context aimed at reducing recidivism). 
